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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) provides the Utah Supreme
Court jurisdiction to decide this appeal.
V.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does

the Utah

Governmental

Immunity

Act, when

applied to shield local government and its employee from liability
for fraud and negligence, violate Utah Const, art. I, § 11?
2.

Is the negligent inspection of a building a core

governmental function?
3.

Does Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 or § 63-30-10.5 waive

any possible statutory immunity granted to Salt Lake County and/or
its building official for the negligent inspection and enforcement
of the building code and/or for the negligent issuance of a
temporary certificate of occupancy?
4.

Are issuing a temporary certificate of occupancy

and/or enforcing the building code ministerial acts not protected
by Utah's governmental immunity statute?
5.

Are there factual issues precluding summary judgment

on claims for fraud?

1

6.

Did the county and/or its building official violate

appellants1 constitutional rights guaranteed by the 1st, 5th and
14th Amendments to the United States Constitution?
The standard of review for each issue follows:
All issues raised from the appeal of an adverse summary
judgment are issues of law with no deference to the trial court.
Feree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).

Further, on appeal,

the party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to
have all the facts presented and all inferences arising therefrom
considered in a light most favorable to him. e.g., Whitman v. W.T.
Grant Co., 395 P.2d 918 (Utah 1964).
In addition, because the DeBrys allege that their 1st
Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances has been
abridged by the County and its employee, any actions that may have
had an effect of curtailing the DeBrys1 exercise of their 1st
Amendment rights must be closely scrutinized.

Eilers v. Palmer,

575 F.Supp. 1259 (D. Minn. 1984).
VI.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The

following

constitutional

provisions,

statutes,

ordinances, rules and regulations are determinative of issues
presented herein.

They are reproduced as part of the appendix to

Appellantsf Brief.
2

Constitutional Provisions
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Utah

Const,
Const,
Const,
Const,

amend. I
amend. V
amend. XIV
art. I, § 11

Statutes
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.
Ann.

§
§
§
§
§

63-30-3
63-30-4
63-30-10
63-30-10.5
63-30-15

Ordinances
Salt Lake County Ordinance Chapter 15 (previously Title II,
Chapter I; adopting the Uniform Building Code)
Uniform Building Code Sections 303(e), 303(b), 305, 307
VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment
to Salt Lake County and its building official Wallace R. Noble.
The case involves multiple parties.

The lower court, pursuant to

U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b), certified this case for appeal.
VIII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, is improperly granted if there is any
genuine issue of material fact. e.g., Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah
3

646, 244 P.2d 862 (1952); Ruffinenao v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah
1978).

When the trial court does grant a motion for summary

judgment, the appellate court views the facts in the light most
favorable to the losing party and gives no deference to the trial
courtfs conclusions which are reviewed for correctness, e.g., Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989); Barber v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988).

Using

the foregoing criteria, the following facts are relevant to the
issues presented for review.
1.

The appellants Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry ("the

DeBrys11) are the purchasers of a newly constructed office building
located at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 563-576;
affidavit of Robert J. DeBry dated 4/10/86 at para. 1.)
2.

The building was purchased from Del Bartel and Dale

Thurgood dba Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade").
the building.

Cascade constructed

(R. 563-76, 4217-4220; affidavits of Robert J. DeBry

dated 4/10/86 and 8/7/87.)
3.

Prior to the construction and purchase, respondent

Salt Lake County

("County") adopted the Uniform Building Code

("UBC").
4.

The UBC imposes simple and direct requirements which

must be complied with before a building can be lawfully built and
occupied.

The person responsible for enforcing the UBC is the
4

building official.

Respondent Wallace R. Noble ("Noble") is the

building official designated by the UBC.

In addition, he was the

county's chief building inspector and in charge of the Countyfs
building

department.

Noble

was

ultimately

responsible

for

enforcing the UBC and all County inspectors were under his direct
supervision and control.

(Deposition of Wallace R. Noble, 3/28/86

pp. 5-6 [hereinafter "Noble depo. pp.
5.

"].)

Pursuant to UBC Section 3 01, it is unlawful to

construct an office building without a building permit.

In

addition, a certificate of occupancy cannot be issued to a builder
who lacks a building permit.
6.

UBC § 202(d) prohibits construction of a building

during a valid stop work order. No certificate of occupancy can be
issued during a stop work order.
7.

UBC § 3 05 requires the building official to conduct

a series of inspections of the building.

No certificate of

occupancy can be issued until the inspections are performed.
8.

UBC § 303(a) (e) requires the builder to have the

county approve his plans prior to construction. No certificate of
occupancy can be issued until the plans are approved.
9.

UBC § 305(c) requires the builder to keep an

inspection report card (the backside of the building permit) posted
at the construction site.
5

10.

Noble and the County have no discretion to:
a)

Ignore a stop work order;

b)

Allow construction to take place without a
building permit or in violation of a stop work
order;

c)

Conduct inspections without the existence of a
valid building permit;

d)

Issue any plumbing or electrical permit prior
to issuing a valid building permit;

e)

Issue a temporary certificate of occupancy
prior to issuing a full building permit;

f)

Fail to enforce or follow the requirements of
the UBC.

(R. 3936-3941; affidavit of G. Ernest Hughes dated
7/14/87.)
11.

Contrary to the UBC, Cascade built the building

without county approved plans.

(Admission #4, Salt Lake County's

Response to Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions [hereinafter
"Admissions"].)
12.

Contrary to the UBC, Cascade built the building in

violation of a valid stop work order issued by the County. (Noble
depo. pp. 40-41; Admissions Nos. 1-2).

6

13.

Contrary to the UBC, Noble and the County failed to

conduct all the inspections set forth in the UBC. Noble performed
no inspections.

The County performed some haphazard inspections.

The inspections were conducted despite the lack of approved plans
and a building permit.

When any inspection was made, the County

inspectors did not check their files and determine whether the
building had a building permit. Nor did the inspectors compare the
construction with any approved plans.

(Noble depo. pp. 10-17, 34-

42.)
14.

The DeBrys closed on the sale of the building in

December of 1985. At that time the DeBrys were unaware of the UBC
violations set forth above.
building was complete

Nevertheless, to assure that the

and safe, a specific

contractual pre-

condition to the closing of the sale was the production of a
certificate of occupancy from the County.

(R. 2301-2303; affidavit

of Robert J. DeBry).
15.

The UBC provides for two types of certificates of

occupancy. The building official may issue a final certificate of
occupancy if the building is complete, all inspections have been
made and the construction meets each and every requirement of the
UBC.

UBC § 307(c).

In addition, the County and its building

official may issue a temporary certificate of occupancy only "if
they find that no substantial hazard will result from occupancy of
7

the building before the same is completed. . . ."

[U.B.C. §

307(d)]. A temporary certificate of occupancy may not be issued if
the building lacks a building permit or if there exists a County
stop work order.
16.

To obtain a temporary certificate of occupancy,

Cascade met Noble at the construction

site.

Noble made no

inspection of the building at that time and he had not made any
previous inspections.

(Noble depo. pp. 10-17.J

his file on the building in his possession.

Noble did not have
He had not examined

his file to determine if proper permits existed or whether the
required inspections had been made. Noble also did not attempt to
verify the building permit and inspection record required by law to
be kept on the construction site.
17.

When

Noble

requested

Cascade

to

show

him

its

building permit, Cascade only produced the footings and foundations
permit.

Noble recognized that Cascade had only a footings and

foundations permit but because Cascade told him it needed the
certificate of occupancy and was pressed for time, Noble issued the
temporary certificate of occupancy.

(Noble depo. pp. 14-17.) The

temporary certificate of occupancy recited a few minor items which
needed to be completed prior to the issuance of a final certificate
of occupancy.

8

18.

At the time, Noble gave Cascade the temporary

certificate of occupancy, Noble knew the DeBrys would rely on the
certificate and purchase the building at a scheduled December
closing.

(Noble depo. pp. 12-13.)
19.

When Noble returned to his office the next day, he

checked his file and discovered that Cascade did not have a
building permit. However, he made no attempt whatsoever to notify
the DeBrys of his mistake in issuing the temporary certificate of
occupancy until 3 0 days later.
20.

(Noble depo. pp. 50-52.)

The closing occurred on December 13, 1985, seven

days after the temporary certificate of occupancy was issued.
Cascade produced the temporary certificate at the closing.
21.

After the DeBrys took possession of the building,

the DeBrys discovered numerous, violations of the UBC. The DeBrys
notified the county of the violations and defects.

However, the

county, instead of requiring the contractor to comply with the
code, used the violations as a pretext to evict the DeBrys and
punish the DeBrys for bringing their complaints to and against the
County.
22.

The DeBrys sued Noble and the County for misrepre-

sentation, fraud, negligence, gross negligence and for violating
the DeBrys1 constitutional rights.

(R. 3366-3499; Second Revised

Substitute Amended Complaint [hereinafter "Complaint"].)
9

Specifically,

the

following representations

DeBrys

complaint

are implicit

in the

said

that

the

issuance of the

temporary certificate of occupancy:
a)

A

valid

building

permit

has

been

issued

for

construction of the building;
b)

The building has been constructed according to the
requirements of the U.B.C.

c)

All legally required inspections have been carried
out;

d)

There is no hazard in allowing the building to be
occupied;

e)

The only work to be completed before issuance of a
permanent certificate of occupancy is listed on the
temporary certificate;

and that the County and Noble knew, or should have known, the
following to be true:
a)

No full building permit had been issued;

b)

A stop work order was in place and had never been
removed;

c)

The building had not been properly inspected;

d)

The building did not meet UBC safety requirements;

e)

The building was hazardous and not safe.

10

The DeBrys said they relied on the misrepresentations and were
damaged.

(R. 3385-3391; Complaint at paragraphs 41-61.)
The DeBrys also alleged that the County had a duty to

enforce the building code for the protection of the plaintiffs and
failed to do so.

(R. 3385; Complaint at paragraph 42.)

Further, the DeBrys alleged that the failure to enforce
the building code by Noble and the County was negligent and caused
damage to the DeBrys.

(R. 3385-87; Complaint at paragraphs 41-48.)

Finally, the DeBrys alleged that the County, by evicting
and pushing them, deprived them of their constitutional rights
protected by the 1st, 5th and 14th Amendments.

(R. 3390-91;

Complaint at paragraphs 55-61.)
Noble and the County moved for summary judgment.

The

lower court did not consider whether the factual elements of
negligence, misrepresentation and fraud are present in this case.
Nor was the court concerned with whether discovery was complete.
Instead, the court ruled that Noble and the County were protected
by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act from being sued for their
errors,

omissions

violations.

and

misrepresentations

and

constitutional

(R. 4243-4245.)

This case was subsequently certified for appeal.
DeBrys timely appealed.

11

The

IX.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents a number of issues of first impression
and other important issues for determination.
The first issue is whether Utah Const, art. I, § 11 is
violated when the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is applied to
shield local governments from liability in tort.
The second issue is whether the negligent failure to
enforce the Uniform Building Code and/or the negligent issuance of
a temporary certificate of occupancy, in violation of the UBC,
creates a liability for recovery against the County, or Noble and
is allowed under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Ann. § 63-30-10 and § 63-30-10.5.

Utah Code

Other states allow recovery.

See, e.g. , Lotter v. Clark County, 793 P.2d 1320 (Nev. 1990);
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719

(1979)

(negligent issuance of a license).
The third issue presented by this appeal is whether the
Governmental Immunity Act bars the Debrys1 claims for fraud and
misrepresentation.
The fourth issue presented on appeal is whether the
County and Noble, based on the Governmental Immunity Act, are
immune from suit for violating the DeBrys1 rights guaranteed by the
1st, 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution.
12

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, AS APPLIED BY THE
TRIAL COURT, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A.

Factual Background.
The trial court held, as a matter of law, that Utah's

Governmental Immunity Act mandated summary judgment in favor of
both the County and Noble on plaintiff's claims of negligence,
fraud and denial of constitutional rights.
In the lower court, the DeBrys claimed that the application of the Governmental Immunity Act to this case violates Utah
Const, art. I, § 11 and to the extent the act requires dismissal of
the DeBrys' claims, the Act is unconstitutional. (R. 3878, 39003903.)
B.

Legal Analysis.
1.

Application of Section 63-30-4 to the claims against
Noble.

At common law, a governmental employee could be sued individually notwithstanding the immunity of the governmental entity:
The Anglo-American tradition did not include a
general theory of immunity from suit or from
liability on the part of the public officers.
It was the boast of Dicey, often quoted, that
" [w]ith us every official from the prime
minister down to a constable or a collector of
taxes, is under the same responsibility for
13

every act done without legal justification as
any other citizen." James, Tort Liability of
Governmental Units, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610,
635 (1955) (footnote omitted).
Similarly, in Utah, government employees could be sued
for negligence in performing their ministerial duties. In Frank v.
State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980) the Court stated:
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act has no
application to individuals; its function is
confined to governmental "entities." Commonlaw principles of sovereign immunity have
developed, however, which offer protection to
the individual under certain circumstances.
The case of Cornwall v. Larsen stands for the
proposition
that
a
governmental
agent
performing a discretionary function is immune
from suit for injury arising therefrom,
whereas an employee acting in a ministerial
capacity, even though his acts may involve
some decision making, is not so protected.
(Citations omitted.)
However, under the current version of Utah's Governmental
Immunity Act, a governmental employee is individually liable only
in the case of fraud or malice.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4.

Utah Const, art. I, § 11 guarantees access to the courts
and a remedy by due course of law which shall be administered
without denial:
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay, and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this state,
14

by himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party.
The leading case on Article I, Section 11 is Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).

In discussing the

conflict which arises between the provisions of Section 11 and the
power of the legislature to limit rights and remedies, the court
stated:
We hold this section 11 of the Declaration of
Rights and the prerogative of the legislature
are properly accommodated by applying a twopart analysis. First, section 11 is satisfied
if the law provides an injured person an
effective and reasonable alternative remedy
"by due course of law11 for vindication of his
constitutional interest. The benefit provided
by the substitute must be substantially equal
in value or other benefit to the remedy
abrogated in providing essentially comparable
substantive protection to one's person,
property, or reputation, although the form of
the substitute remedy may be different.
* * *

Second, if there is no substitute or
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the
remedy or cause of action may be justified
only if there is a clear social or economic
evil to be eliminated and the elimination of
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary
or unreasonable means for achieving the
objective.
717 P.2d at 680 (citations
omitted) .
In Beech, the Utah court relied upon New York Central
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) wherein the United States
Supreme Court stated:
15

It perhaps may be doubted whether the state
could abolish all rights of action on the one
hand, or all defenses on the other, without
setting upon something in their stead. 24 3
U.S. at 201.
In summary, the lower court's application of Section 6330-4 in this case is constitutional under Article I, Section ll1
only if: (1) an effective and reasonable alternative remedy is
provided; or (2) a clear social or economic evil is eliminated and
such elimination is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of
meeting the objective.

Berry v. Delta Aircraft, supra.

In the present case, application of Section 63-30-4 to
abolish the right to sue a county employee for negligence in
administering and enforcing the UBC violates Section 11 because the
Legislature did not provide any effective and reasonable method of
recovery for injuries caused by the failure to administer and
enforce the building code.

Further, Section 63-30-4 does not

address any existing social or economic evil.

Therefore, the

abolition of the common law right to sue governmental employees for
ministerial acts is arbitrary and does not reasonably and substantially advance any legitimate legislative purpose.

In fact,

*In the recently decided case of Hansen v. Salt Lake County,
794 P. 2d 838 (1990) , the Utah Supreme Court noted that applications
of immunity had the potential to create conflicts with Article I
Section 11.
16

elimination of governmental employee accountability is likely to
create evil and mischief and eliminates individual responsibility.
The net result will be to induce governmental employees to be less
careful and professional and encourage harmful performance and
carelessness.

Finally, Section 63-30-4 is arbitrary because it

applies to all levels of misconduct ranging from discretionary
policy making

decisions to the most trivial

acts of hourly

employees.
For these reasons, the trial court's application of Section
63-30-4 to bar all of the DeBrys1 claims against Noble for damages
caused by his ministerial acts violates Utah Const, art. I, § 11.
2.

Application of Section 63-30-4 to the claims against the
County.
Immunity

of state government stands on a different

footing than immunity of a county.
immune from suit.
1983) .

Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P. 2d 627, 629 (Utah

On the other hand, counties were routinely sued in both

state and federal courts.
662

At common law, the state was

(1980).

Owen v. City of Independence, 44 5 U.S.

A county retained limited immunity for strictly

governmental functions but there was no common law immunity for
proprietary functions.

Id.

In Madsen v. Borthick, supra, the Utah Supreme Court
ruled that the governmental immunity act, as applied to state
17

officials, did not violate Article I, Section 11 because immunity
of

state

government

had

always

existed.

658 P.2d

at 629.

(Emphasis added.) However, immunity for the proprietary acts of a
county did not exist at common law. At common law, the state could
delegate a limited form of immunity to a political subdivision for
strictly governmental functions. However, under common law, states
could not delegate immunity to counties for proprietary functions.
Owen v. City of Independence, supra,

at 645, n. 27 and n. 28;

Weiner v. Metropolitan Trans. Authority, 435 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1981).
Time and time again, this Court emphasized that there
simply is no immunity for county proprietary functions. Hansen v.
Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 (1990); and in Standiford v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Utah 1980).

As set forth in

the Statement of Facts section of this brief, the DeBrys are suing
the County for negligently performing its proprietary functions,
i.e., for negligent inspection and enforcement of the County's
building code.

At common law, the County was not immune.

alternative remedy is provide to the DeBrys.
eliminated.

No

No economic evil is

Thus, application of the Governmental Immunity Act to

bar the DeBrys1 claims against the County violates Utah Const, art.
I, § 11.
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A.

Introduction,
The one and only basis for the lower court's entr> of

summary judgment w a s the lower c our t:' ' s <= .r r c i leous coi lclusi on ti: lat
the

Government.a j Immunity

aq.'j i nr.f thr

'

Su-uiUax ?
1)

Act bars

*

:•:

a:

- '" •

'.;\e DeBrys'

claims

— •r

ujM.iici,, .., c p p r o p r i u , . ^ ::..'. . ::

A p p l i c a t i o n of -:•-.:•• G o v e r n m e n t a l

Immunity A c t does

i

2)

Trx

s

... ir,-j -i .•• s rio' iepr'ive t h e D e B r y s

con^ 1 ' i r1.:*- i ^ni 1 - \ rv; Tr

: :;•:•:'* e^"

and

to

14 Lh

Amendments

the

r

their

-^*
.;

*
t~tes

Constitution;
3)

r-

oppose i
4)

:

5)

There are

.-r

i , ; , etai . •
;
factual is-,ie:.- \

Jeterru,:- ^.-.r^her

the County acts and duties were ministerial rather
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• •

T h e Governmental Immunity A c t applies to a ] 1 of the
D e B r y s 1 c] a i m s ; .
.1 9

jth

7)

Summary judgment was entered after an adequate time
allowed for discovery.

Downtown Athletic Club v.

Hormon, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987).
Point I of this brief shows that application of the
Governmental Immunity Act violates Utah Const, art. I, § 11. Point
III of this brief identifies the constitutional rights the lower
court denied the DeBrys. Point IV argues that summary judgment is
premature.
B.

This section will address issues (3) through (6).

Fact Issues Must be Resolved to Determine Whether the County
and Noble Performed Governmental or Proprietary Functions.
The leading case on governmental immunity is Standiford

v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).

In Standiford

the Court stated:
We, therefore, hold that the test for determining governmental immunity is whether the
activity under consideration is of such a
unique nature that it can only be performed by
a government agency or that it is essential to
the core of government activity2.
605 P.2d at 1236-37.

2

This test may be deemed modified by the 1987 legislature in
its amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act. However, any such
changes would have only prospective application and would not apply
to this case. See, Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake
City Corp,, 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 415
A.2d 80 (Pa. 1980); Bershefskv v. Commonwealth, 418 A.2d 1331 (Pa.
1980).
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. . . of such a unique nature that it can only
be performed by a government agency or that it
is essential to the core of governmental
activity,
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra, at 1236.
In Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 629 P.2d 432, 434
(Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court explained:
The first part of the Standiford test—
activity of such a unique nature that it can
only be performed by a governmental agency—
does not refer to what government may do, but
to what government alone must do.
The enforcement and administration of the building code
are not "essential to the core of governmental activity."
v. Utah Mortgage & Loan Co., 716 P.2d 783 (Utah 1986).

In Cox

The City of

Pleasant Grove made an argument similar to that of the County in
this case.
Pleasant Grove contends that it alone, within
the limits of its jurisdiction, must adopt and
apply ordinances regulating zoning and subdivisions and perform all the concomitant
duties attendant to those functions. 716 P.2d
at 785.
In rejecting the argument, the Supreme Court stated:
The enumeration of those functions misdirects
the focus away from the precise activity, viz.
whether the supervision of disbursements from
escrowed funds was of such a unique nature
that it could only be performed by a governmental entity or whether it was essential to
the core of governmental activity. The answer
to that inquiry is clearly no. The supervision of disbursements from escrowed funds is
not sui generis governmental. Id.
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Indeed, the County has itself, on occasion, contracted
with private firms to conduct services required under the UBC
Ernest Hughes, a county employee, stated in his Affidavit:
• . . [W]hen the Plans Examination Office [of
Salt Lake County] is very busy, they will contract out plan examinations to private architects, engineers, and International Conference
of Building Officials plan checking services.
(R. 3936-41) (affidavit of Ernest Hughes at paragraph 5).
Other states conclude that enforcement of the building
code is a proprietary rather than a government function. In Wilson
v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979), the Iowa Supreme Court
imposed liability for a negligent inspection.

The Municipality

claimed it was immune from suit for a negligent inspection.

The

Municipality further stated that if it were to be held responsible
for

negligent

inspections.

inspections,

it

would

quit

performing

any

In rejecting the Municipality's claim to immunity,

the Iowa Supreme Court stated " . . . no inspection is better than
a negligent one" and that:
In the event of withdrawal [of governmental
inspectors], the void might be filled by
private agencies whose certificates could be
relied upon by persons risking their lives and
property. . . .
282 N.W.2d at 673-674 (emphasis added).
In some states such a process has already begun. For example:
It is very common in California for Municipalities to contract with [private] consulting
24

inspections
i::. is also very c o m m o n for
g o v e r n m e n t a l u n i t s to contract with p r i v a t e
p e r s o n s or firms t o review p r o p o s e d build-.r.p l a n s for compliance w i t h b u i l d i n g c o d e s .
Affidavi t

,i:",c: ._.._,.-, ; ..

.;i-r -

U r a h ! s ciocorine -\\ acve:r;ien::u
' ,'''fr-": -"r -

J

" ' ".

J. -JPiLs / &^ <«-*<.•,

in.

g o v e r n i*~~f

.TA-L-.V .__.-...-

_ • -.__-

M i c h i g a n p r e c e d e n t is p e r s u a s i v e ,
M^.:-'

*

"I'h::

=^*-.?. .-

S_eo, ^tLan-iii.ki.:

v. Hartmai .•••.'%••

Court state/:

i m m u n i t y w a s ^ppa:- 4;,

inspect io*'- w.-amar/e

. • ne Co^r*

m

Brand

j

ielr *"h;*r

is r: ^ cr the. ossen e of

n a n y s e n s e of t h e e x p r e s s ] c n, "

332 N.W.2d a t 4833.

F u r t h e r , in a n u m b e r of other s t a t e s w h e r e t h e q u e s t i o n
has arisen, ] iabi1ity has been imposed for negliqent inspecti ons.
See,

e . c r. Lotter v

Brand

v. H a r t m a n ,

197 6) ; Brown

Clark County, supra.; Wilson \ , Nepsta d, supra,
supra,

v, Svson,

Adams

v. State,

,1 3 5 Ari z . 567 , 663 P 2d 2 51

1 98 3 ) ; Y QUI iq v . Cit y of Inqlewood, I! 5 4 3. ]
3d 437

5 5 5 P. 2 d 2 3 5

E]:: d

321

(A1 ask a

(Ari z , App.
9 2 2i „]

I i }: p .

(197 9) ; Winters v. City of Commerce City, 648 P. 2d ] 75

(Colo, App. 1 982) ; Jones v. City of St ._ Maries, 727 P. 2d 1 1 6II (Ida
19 8 6) ; S t ewai t v

Scl line idei , 3 8 6 Si ) 2 • ::! It 3 51! (I i ] 9 8 0) ; L a n d s fie Id.

v, R. J, Smith C o n t r a c t o r s , I n c . , 1 46 Mi ch , A p p . 6 3 2 , 3 8 1 N W , 2 d
j

The "essence of g o v e r n i n g " t e s t w a s later a b a n d o n e d by r.:
Mi c h i g a n Court In R o s s v. C o n s u m e r s P o w e r C o . . 363 N . W . ? ^ *4 .
6(1 (Mi ch. ~~r:r ,
25

782 (1985); Garrett v. Holiday Inns, 447 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. App.
1983); Sexstone v. City of Rochester. 301 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1969);
O'Brien v. Eaelhoff. 459 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1984); Campbell v. City
of Bellevue, 530 P.2d 234 (Wash. 1975);

Wood v. Milin. 397 N.W.2d

479 (Wise, 1986).
In short, inspection of buildings is far from the "core
of governmental activity."
in the activity.

Private enterprise is deeply involved

In fact, as suggested by the Iowa Supreme Court

in Wilson, perhaps the private sector can do a better job. At the
very least, the lower court should have held a trial to receive
evidence to determine whether building inspections and issuing
certificates of occupancy are core governmental activities as
required by Standiford.
C»

Even if the Injury Resulted From a Governmental Function,
Immunity Has Been Expressly Waived.
If this Court determines that the inspection of buildings

under construction is not a governmental function, that is the end
of the analysis, and the Court should reverse the order of the
trial court granting summary judgment and remand the case for
trial.
However, if this Court concludes that the inspection of
building construction is a uniquely governmental function and that
the Governmental Immunity Act is constitutional as applied to this
26
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A number of the DeBrys1 claims fall outside the waiver
exceptions set forth in Section 63-30-10.
First, the DeBrys claim that the building was constructed
in violation of a County stop work order. The stop work order was
not enforced as a result of the negligence of Noble and the others
in his department.

The failure to enforce a "stop work order,fl

which by force of law prohibits construction, is not a listed
exception to § 63-30-10.

County employees have no discretion to

fail to obey the law or to act or fail to act in compliance
therewith.

See, Brennen v. City of Eugene, supra at 727. There-

fore, immunity has been waived for this claim.
Second, the DeBrys claim that the County failed to follow
and enforce its own regulations by permitting the contractor to
construct the building and obtain a temporary certificate of
occupancy when there was no valid building permit and a stop work
order was extant.

Noble knew the only permit was a footings and

foundations permit, not a full building permit.

The failure to

insist on compliance with the Code and failure to enforce existing
laws and regulations is not a listed exemption to immunity under §
63-30-10.

Public policy demands that members of the public be

allowed to assume the County will follow its own laws and that
If it is ultimately determined on the facts that building
inspections are not governmental functions, it makes no difference
whether or not the activities fall under § 63-30-10.
28

:;
See,

o.
Wi lson ••/ > Nepstad, suprc

v.- ••i'c»?rvt-': * " *'-<•"' wi_l_sp_n .~^i>~t

'^dRpd

.

c a s e,

:::ennan v. City of Eugene, b , ; ^

.

.

s up ra,

"No

nspectior

-: - 'A,~ .

'3

exp1aIns

th e

prIncIp1e

th a t

immunized from liabi 3 i ty for the po] icy decis
type of _
which cast

liabii: 4

''ACVC;

..

~<~ Brjenrr"

exists *

* *

I J tal I I .egi

:,a

:>> r. recognizee

'c- :*

"^ ^^° *-*<-**

egi.'jent laiiurc *

N -v^ii r

=i Jt.

re a~~ ^

"tatute

.

ricwever

^e_t:, batie: v • Bogdanovicn,
x

* it-

u-

numerous
- -^ -•_

*

courts,

^r*orir ^"<

t,.

.^er

^ « -3u-

Nevada La- nelc • r.ar.

-.

'n

'srect.

*

prooe: . ; ;<-r:-. rr w

. n a , L-

*

u: ,,c- . : .,

would not lie for a declsior r,r*- *

inclu '\*z-

inspec*

^

manner :ii i I v hich i nspections are *

] • I::l: i e
; .•

~ hotter

- ^ -4,

;.er<:

^• - • •

'The language of § 63-30-3'1} fi provides immunity frr "failure
w. make an inspection"; however. „.o immunity is crartr.d fc-r P.~.
inspection undertaken by the county and then :.• gi: .:ent-_*
illegally performed, Thus, jliintiffs 1 claims that tne egl-gence
of county inspectors in failing to follow the requirements cf the
code during the performance
cf inspections
and concurrent
negligence in fail;;;
li^ccver >&c* , : ;:lding ; erir:' n I
existence of a stop ^ork order is not covered oy the ex\:ept.
the general waiver of immunity foi:-i -n Subspr^-'r- ."•x '*.
29

663 (1985) . Indeed, in the recent case of Lotter v. Clark County,
supra, the Nevada Supreme Court held that an allegation that had
the County inspected, a defect would have been discovered, stated
a cause of action.
The reasoning of the courts in Standiford, Brennan,
Wilson, Butler and Lotter is compelling.

The failure to enforce

the county's own laws and regulations is not a listed exception to
the general waiver of immunity in set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 633 0-10.

This Court should hold that there is no immunity for such

a failure.

Standiford v. Salt Lake County, supra; Lotter v. Clark

County, supra; Wilson v. Nepstad, supra; Brennan v. City of Eugene,
supra.

The public has a right to rely upon the county performing

those tasks the County undertakes to perform, in a non-negligent
manner.
In summary, immunity from the Debrys1 claims based upon
the County's failure to follow regulations and enforce a stop work
order is waived by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.
In addition to the foregoing, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5
(1987) provides for a waiver of immunity which applies to this
case:
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for the recovery of
compensation from the governmental entity when
the governmental entity has taken or damaged
private property without just compensation.
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Fact Issues Exist which Must be k e s m v e a to Determine Whether
the Duties of the County and Noble are Ministerial Functions
not Protected by Statutory Immunity.
"I "I'M' ntah
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functions a- jiv.se at "the basic poiicy ituik L nof love J" annl
w: icr ^".r

II

* "routine, every day matters, not requiring evaluation
t acini

>.'diioI v. ijtale Road Commission, 2' Utah

z; 384, 3<r,< , 496 P.2d 388, 891 (1972); re-affirmed

In Bigelow v.

• :f- p.2d L.n, £»i (Utah 1980).

Inaerscj 1

, i I i a a t cl i UJI-

* nei:
. , ,

IMII

.

3-

, saa i e 1 aa :
,
^z.^i.ose
,-:;::..ental acts
aaa
iea:r. :r
impacting
; large numbers of people
myriad of unforeseeable ways from individual
and class actions, the continual threat cf
which would make public administration all >^.
impossible - Frank va State, su£/ ; .* ~;c

Trr*

i mpl rr.entar i oa

. *> J ... •
application

*
: : r.:s r rlncipit*.

E4.ULL* \ _ Servi res
decis i:

: rre\ ously

-

.. -ace

:-•;-•

made
*

pcilcie•

^r ;
r" rate

.; Little v. Utah State LiVisi.n c:
>.•

._-..:
31

' •.

,,.r: K

implementation of the decision was not.

In Doe v. Arquelles, 716

P. 2d 279 (Utah 1985), the decision to place a prisoner on parole
was found to be discretionary, while the implementation of the
decision was non-discretionary.
In the present case, the decision to adopt the Uniform
Building

Code

and

to

require

compliance

therewith

was

discretionary, a legislative decision.

However, the day-to-day

enforcement of the Code is ministerial.

See, Affidavit of James

Brogan at paragraph 8-9.

(R. 3931.)

The recent case of Jones v. City of St. Maries, 772 P.2d
1161 (Ida. 1986), is illustrative.

Plaintiff claimed the City

negligently inspected water mains and fire hydrants.
claimed immunity.

The City

The Idaho Supreme Court stated:

The ^planning/operational test1 [is used] for
determining whether a particular governmental
action is discretionary. . . . The planning/
operational
test provides
immunity
for
planning activities—activities which involve
the establishment of plans, specifications and
schedules where there is room for policy
judgment
and
decisions.
Operational
activities — activities
involving
the
implementation of statutory and regulatory
policy—are not immunized and, accordingly,
must be performed with ordinary care.
Id. at 1163-64.
Other courts have held that checking building plans for
compliance with legal requirements is a non-discretionary act for
which liability may be imposed.
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locision entitled to immunity.

O'Brien v. E q e l h o f f ,

T h u s , the v a r i o u s o m i s s i o n s by the County and Noble arc not

discretionary

and

do

not

fall

within

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

63-30-

).

At

a mini mum,

there

are

factual

issues whicl i m u s t

be

d e t e r m i n e d b e f o r e a p r o p e r r e s o l u t i o n of the immunity question can

Corp. , s u p r a ,

the

court held

that

:ii n a case

decided

on m o t ion

bel ow, the I Jtah Supreme Court di d not h a v e the b e n e f i t of a factual
r ecor d

a i i • :i c o u 1 d i I • : t ,

1 1 i e i e f o i: e,
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d e t e r m 11 :t. e

z„ s

z

m a t t: e i : : f ] z ;

whether the acts complained of were discretionary.
464.

784 P. 2d at

The same situation occurred in Hansen v. Salt Lake County,

supra. The same situation exists in the present case. The factual
issues need development and, therefore, it was error for the trial
court to grant the County's motion for summary judgment.
E.

The Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Bar the DeBrys' Claims
for Fraud and Misrepresentation.
1.

Factual background.
The DeBrys sued the County and Noble for fraud and

concealment. Noble issued a temporary certificate of occupancy at
a time when by his own testimony he knew there was not a valid
building permit.

A temporary

certificate of occupancy

is a

representation by the County that all permits are in order, all
required inspections have been made and no hazard will result from
occupancy of the building.

See U.B.C. §307(d).

These represen-

tations were false and Noble knew or should have known they were
false.
2.

Legal analysis.
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the
multifarious means which human ingenuity can
devise and are resorted to. . . . [I]t
comprises all acts, omissions and concealments
involving a breach of legal or equitable duty
and resulting damage to another.

Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1978).
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In

fact,

tl :ie Governmem-a .

Immun: t

specifically authorizes lawsuits for fraud against gov ernmental
:i o y e e s ,

U t a h C o d e Anr I

§ 63- 3 0 - I .
POINT III

THERE IS NO IMMUNITY AGAINST DEBRYSf CLAIT'?
FOR DEPRIVATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A.

Introduction.
The i *t Amendmer*

the government

. ~ +c ^

'or * redress

r

t^e

DeBrys' rights to petiti on

.. ievances.
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The 5th Amendment

prevents the DeBrys from being deprived
property without due process of law.

of life, liberty or

Both of these rights are

applicable to the states by way of the due process clause in the
14th Amendment.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

The DeBrys sued the County for depriving them of their
constitutional

rights

guaranteed

by

the

1st,

5th

and

14th

Amendments.
Specifically, the DeBrys claimed that the County deprived
the DeBrys1 constitutional rights by:
1.

Evicting the DeBrys as retaliation for the DeBrys
filing a complaint with and against the County.

2.

Engaging in a systematic failure to enforce the
law.

The DeBrys claimed that the violation of their constitutional rights caused them damage including the loss of use of
their property (the building).

(R. 3390-91.)

The lower court did not determine whether the DeBrys were
factually deprived of any constitutional rights nor whether the
DeBrys sustained damages. What the court did do, was hold that the
County and Noble are immune from suit.
because

there

is no

immunity

for

(R. 4243-45.)

abridging

an

However,

individual's

constitutional rights, the decision of the lower court must be
reversed and the constitutional claims set for trial.
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- isted on

temporary

"

(Noble depo. II pp. 107-08; Eriksson depo. pp. 95-96.) The notice
was never given.

(Noble depo. II pp. 107-08.)

This case is the only case in the history of Salt Lake
County where an occupant has been ordered to vacate a new building
after a temporary certificate of occupancy has been issued.

(Noble

depo. II pp. 105, 112; Eriksson depo. pp. 40-82.)
The County's order to vacate was issued soon after the
DeBry's filed their notice of claim with the County.

(Eriksson

depo. pp. 83, 84.)
2.

Legal analysis.
The first amendment grants an individual the constitu-

tional

right

grievances."

to

"petition

the

government

U.S. Const, amend. I.

for

a

redress

of

The DeBrys right to petition

for redress and the right of free speech are 1st Amendment
guarantees subject to the same constitutional analysis.
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598

e.g. ,

(1985); Singh v. Lamar

University, 635 F.Supp. 737 (E.D. Tex. 1986); see generally. State
v. Chima, 23 Utah 2d 360, 365, 463 P.2d 807 (1970).
The rights set forth in the 1st Amendment apply to the
states and their local government by way of the due process clause
contained in the 14th Amendment.

e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391

U.S. 145 (1968); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328 (10th Cir. 1981);
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tne DeBrys claimed that the County evi cted

them from ~V> building a^ retaliation lor filing a notice of claim
wi th the County.
Presenting a notice of claim, i s protected speech for 1st
A mendmei it pi lrposes

s e e, Pickering \', Flacke , 4 53 N , Y, r:, 2d 1 016 ,

1018 (N.Y.Supp. 1982),
protected

by

the

Similarly, the DeBrys1 right to 1 i. tigate Is

1st Amendment.

A m e r i c a. n W o i I d AI r w a / s, 6 0 1 f

Laker

Airways, Ltd.

v.

Pan

8 4) ; Eilei s v.

Palmer, 57 5 F.Supp. 2 2 59 (I) M
The DeBrys have the i<rih*
the fear of retribute oi i.

Simp
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*~ ~ «^*Mt:r^ * rr r^dre-rs wirnour

may punish, penalize, investigate or retaliate against the DeBrys
for exercising their 1st Amendment rights.

Lipinski v. Dietrich,

578 F.Supp. 235 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Grove School v. Guardianship and
Advocacy Commission, 596 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. 111. 1984); Abrams v.
City of Chicago, 635 F.Supp. 169 (N.D. 111. 1986); Martinez v.
Winner, 771 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1985).

Whether retaliation exists

is a question of fact precluding summary judgment.

see, Alabama

State Federation of Teachers AFL-CIQ v. James, 656 F.2d 193 (4th
Cir. 1981).
If a jury finds that retaliation exists, neither the
County nor Noble have statutory immunity for depriving the DeBrys
of their constitutional rights.

Grandstaff v. City of Borger,

supra; Martinez v. California, supra.
There simply is no immunity for local government nor its
employee

acting

in

his

official

capacity

individual of his constitutional rights.
Independence,

445 U.S. 662 (1980).

for

depriving

an

e.g. , Owen v. City of

They are liable for injury

caused by their unconstitutional policies or practices. Monell v.
N.Y.C. Department of Social Services, 476 U.S. 65 (1988).

Whether

there is a policy or practice which causes the unconstitutional
result is a jury question.

Video International Products Inc. v.

Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, (5th Cir.
1988) .
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Similarly, whether Noble has qualified immunity from suit
in his personal capacity is also a fact question.
defense

of good

faith qualified

immunity

The common law

for a governmental

employee sued in his individual capacity applies when the defendant
performs his statutory duty honestly and in good faith. Hiorth v.
Whittenburg, 241 P.2d 907 (Utah 1952). Whether Noble performed his
duty honestly and in good faith are both questions of fact. see.
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 345 (10th Cir. 1973).

The lower

court made no finding and there was no factual showing that Noble
performed his duties honestly and in good faith.
In summary, there is a factual issue as to whether the
County and Noble evicted the DeBrys as retaliation for the Debrys
exercising their 1st, 5th and 14th Amendment rights to petition
for redress of their grievances. There is also a factual issue as
to whether the DeBrys were deprived of their constitutional rights
pursuant to a practice or policy of the County.

The lower court

could not and did not resolve these fact issues. The court merely
ruled that the County and Noble are immune from the Debrysf
constitutional claims. However, there is no statutory immunity for
local government and its employee acting in his official capacity.
Moreover, whether Noble has qualified immunity from suit in his
individual capacity depends upon whether he acted honestly and in
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good faith, both of which are factual issues precluding summary
judgment.
c

*

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Bar the DeBrvsf
Due Process Claims Based on the County's Systematic Failure to
Enforce the Law.
1.

Factual basis for the claim.
The facts establishing the County's and Noble's syste-

matic failure to enforce the building code are set forth in the
statement of the case section of this brief.

Essentially, the

County and Noble:
1.

Failed to require the builder to obtain a building
permit;

2.

Failed to require the builder to proceed

from

approved plans;
3.

Failed to conduct all the inspections required by
the UBC;

4.

Conducted haphazard and incomplete inspections;

5.

Failed to require the builder to meet the requirements for a temporary certificate of occupancy;

6.

Failed to require the builder to maintain approved
plans and an inspection record on the construction
site; and

7.

Failed to enforce its stop work order.

42

As a result of the County's failure to enforce the law,
the DeBrys purchased a defective office building.
repair the building exceeds $333,515.

The cost to

In addition, the County

prevented the DeBrys from using the building. The additional rent
paid by the DeBrys totals over $351,6047.
2.

Legal analysis.
The due process clause prevents local government from

denying individuals a liberty or property interest without due
process of law.

Martinez v. California. 277 U.S. 279 (1980).

A

"property interest" for due process purposes "denotes a broad range
of interests that are secured by existing rules or understanding."
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d
1243, 1297 (Utah 1982). The property interests are defined broadly
because:
The spirit of enterprise which impels a person
to initiate and develop a business which
provides services to the public and employment
for others is vital to the common welfare. Id.
Specifically, the right to occupy a house or building is
a property right protected by the due process clause. Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Polenz v. Parrott, 853 F.2d 551 (7th
Cir. 1989).

7

These figures were developed in testimony at trial of the main
action. Trial Transcript pp. 698, 845.
43

[A] property right is not just title but the
right of exclusive use and enjoyment.
Polenz at 557.
The DeBrys have a property right to occupy and use their
building.

As such, they are entitled to due process which

includes, but is not limited to, the County following and enforcing
its own law. The systematic failure to enforce the law is a denial
of due process.
1978) .

e.g. , Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 793 (9th Cir.

Specifically, the omission to act in violation of a duty

imposed by statute is a violation of due process.

Id.

The foregoing principles apply to zoning, building and
land use

laws and regulations.

e.g.,

Southern

Co-operative

Development Fund v. Driggers, 696 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1983).
Property owners have a due process right which require local
governments to follow their own laws and regulations in issuing or
denying zoning, building and occupancy permits.

Polenz, supra;

Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983); Leverett
v. Town of Limon, 567 F.Supp. 471 (D.Colo. 1983); c. f. , West
Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners, 586 P.2d
429 (Utah 1978).

In this case the court failed to follow its own

laws and denied the DeBrys their rights to due process and as set
forth in Point III(D) above, there is no applicable immunity
available to the County and its employee.
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POINT IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PREMATURE
Summary judgment should not be granted until discovery is
completed since discovery may create genuine issues of material
fact.

e.g., Downtown Athletic Club v. Hormon, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah

App. 1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1277.
In this case, discovery was and is not complete.8
Factual issues exist as to whether enforcement of the building code
and issuing an improper certificate of occupancy are governmental
functions or proprietary functions.

Factual issues exist as to

whether Noble's errors were performed as part of his ministerial
duties.

Further, practically every element of the DeBrys1 claims

for fraud and concealment require the resolution of factual issues.
For these reasons, summary judgment is premature.

8

The Motion for Summary Judgment in this case was made and
granted prior to completion of discovery. Subsequent discovery in
this case, and a pending case in the United States District Court,
has revealed evidence that supports a claim of gross negligence by
Mr. Noble and numerous other employees of his department who
scheduled and carried out over 12 inspections without even checking
the file to discover the stop work order and lack of proper
permits. Inspections also failed to discover obvious structural
defects. The trial court, had it allowed discovery to unfold prior
to the Summary Judgment Motion, could have allowed amendment to
assert gross negligence at the time other amendments to pleadings
were allowed. Also, the court would have had a better understanding of the magnitude of the County's acts had discovery been
completed prior to hearing the motion. It is generally held that
Summary Judgment should not be granted prior to the completion of
discovery. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, supra.
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XI.
CONCLUSION
The lower court granted summary judgment not because
there are no genuine issues of material fact, but because it
erroneously concluded that Utah's Governmental Immunity Act bars
the DeBrys1 claims. However:
1.

Application

of

the

Governmental

Immunity

Act

violates Utah Const, art. I, § 11;
2.

There is no immunity for the DeBrys1 claims for
deprivation of their constitutional rights;

3.

There is no immunity for the DeBrys1 fraud claims;

4.

Any possible immunity has been specifically waived
by statute;

5.

There are factual issues which must be resolved to
determine whether

the

functions

performed

were

governmental as opposed to proprietary;
6.

There are factual issues which must be resolved to
determine whether the acts and duties are discretionary rather than ministerial;

7.

Summary judgment was premature.

For the reasons set forth herein, this court should
reverse the order of the District Court which granted summary
46

judgment to defendants Wallace R. Noble and Salt Lake County and
remand the case for a trial on the merits of the DeBrys' claims.
DATED this 2 z _ ' d a y

of

January, 1991.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

7 WEL'LS
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CONSTITUTION
of the

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMENDMENT 1
Religious and political freedom.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

AMENDMENT 5
Criminal actions—Provisions concerning—Due process of law and
just compensation clauses.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any cnminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT 14
Section 1. Citizens of the United States.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. Representatives—Power to reduce apportionment.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State.
Sec. 3. Disqualification to hold office.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath,
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Sec. 4. Public debt not to be questioned—Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or
obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slaves; but all such
debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Sec. 5. Power to enforce amendment.
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

oo-ov-o.

i m m u n i t y ui g u v e r n m e m m entities u u u i auiu

Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities.

63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity —
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise
assert under state or federal law.
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice.
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority,
unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or
malice-

by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions — Waiver for inj u r y caused by violation of fourth
a m e n d m e n t rights.
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function, whether or not the discretion is abused;
or
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights; or
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal
to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or
# (d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate or
negligent inspection of any property; or
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution
of any judicial or administrative proceeding,
even if malicious or without probable cause; or
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional; or
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful
assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence,
and civil disturbances; or
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; or
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or

(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person
in any state prison, county, or city jail or other
place of legal confinement; or
(k) arises from any natural condition on state
lands or the result of any activity authorized by
the State Land Board; or
(2) arises out of the activities of providing
emergency medical assistance, fighting fire, handling hazardous materials, or emergency evacuations.
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth amendment
rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall
be the exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected
rights. If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or
any parts thereof are held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall he void and governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for
violations of fourth amendment rights.
1985
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private p r o p e r t y without compensationCD Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from
the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property without
just compensation.

63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time
for filing action against governmental entity.
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.

78-2-2.

Supreme Court jurisdiction.

(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(£) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the

Supreme Court shall review those cases certitied to it by the Court
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6)
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTITCLE 1. sec, 11

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party.

1896

Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

NEVADA

REVISED

STATUTES

41.033, Conditions and limitations on actions: Failure to inspect or
discover.
No action may be brought under NRS 41.031 or against an officer or
employee of the state or any of its agencies or political subdivisions which is
based upon:
1. Failure to inspect any building, structure or vehicle, or to inspect the
construction of any street, public highway or other public work to determine
any hazards, deficiencies or other matters, whether or not there is a duty to
inspect;
2. Failure to discover such hazard, deficiency or other matter, whether or
not an inspection is made. (1965, p. 1413; 1967, p. 993; 1977, p. 1537.)
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15.08.010

Chapter 15.08
UNIFORM BUILDING CODE
Sections:
15.08.010
15.08.020
15.08.025
15.08.030

Uniform Building Code
adopted—Amendment of
Section 304, Fees.
Amendment of Table No. 3-A,
building permit fees.
Appendix Chapter 7 adoptedAviation control towers.
Amendment of Table Nos. 70A and 70-B.

15.08.010

Uniform Building code adopted—
Amendment of Section 304, Fees.
A. The Uniform Building Code, as adopted
by the state as the construction standard to be
adhered to by political subdivisions of the state (§
58-50-17 U.CA.) is adopted by the county,
together with the following chapters of the
Appendix to the Uniform Building Code:
Chapter 7. Division I. Covered Mall Buildings, and Division II. Aviation Control Towers;
Chapter 11. Agricultural Buildings;
Chapter 12. Division II. Requirements for
Group R, Division 4 Occupancies;
Chapter 23. Division I. Alternate Snow Load
Design, and Division II. Earthquake Recording
Instrumentation;
Chapter 49. Patio Covers;
Chapter 55. Membrane Structures;
Chapter 70. Excavation and Grading.
B. Section 304(c) of the Uniform Building
Code is amended to read as follows:
(c) Plan Review Fees. When the valuation
of the proposed construction exceeds
$2,000.00, and a plan or other data are
required to be submitted by subsection (b) of
section 302 of the Uniform Building Code, a
plan review fee shall be paid at the time of
submitting plans to the County for review.
Said plan review fee shall be 40 percent of the
(Salt Lake County 8-89)
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building permit fee for R-3 and all M occupancies, and shall be 65 percent of the building
permit fee for all other occupancies.
When, in the opinion of the building official, plans can be reviewed over the counter,
the plan review fee shall not exceed $30.00.
Plans which have been previously reviewed
and placed in the County's plan card file in
contemplation of future permit issuance shall
be charged a plan review fee of $30.00. Such
plans may be used for issuing new permits for
as long as the plans are on file, except that any
such plans which are not used for a period of
two years must be resubmitted for a full plan
review, with all required fees, if they are to be
used again. All such plans are subject to having
their valuation and fees adjusted to current
rates, and must be brought into compliance
with any changes to building codes and ordinances.
Where plans are incomplete or changed so
as to require additional plan review, an additional plan review fee shall be charged at the
rate shown in Table No. 3-A.
C. Section 304(e) is amended to read as follows:
(e) Investigation Fees: Work Without a Permit.
1. Investigation. Whenever any work for
which a permit is required by this code has
been commenced withoutfirstobtaining said
permit, a special investigation shall be made
before a permit may be issued for such work.
2. Fee. An investigation fee, in addition to
the permit fee, shall be collected whether or
not a permit is then or subsequently issued.
The investigation fee shall be assessed in
accordance with Table No. 3-A as amended by
Section 15.08.020. The payment of such investigation fee shall not exempt any person from
compliance with all other provisions of this
code, norfromany penalty prescribed by law.
(Ord. 1048 § 1,1988)

15.08.020

15.08.020

Amendment of Table No. 3-A,
Building Permit Fees.
That portion of Table No. 3-A entitled "Other
inspections and fees," of the Uniform Building
Code, as adopted by the state of Utah, is

TABLE NO. 70-A — GRADING PLAN REVIEW FEES
Plan review fees shall be 30 percent of the Grading Permit Fee.
TABLE NCX 70-B — GRADING PERMIT FEES
Quantity of cot or fill
100 cubic yards or less
100 to 1000 cubic yards

amended to read as follows:
1000 to 10,000 cubic yards

OTHER INSPECTIONS AND FEES:
10.000 to 100.000 cubic yards
Reinspection fee assessed under provisions of
Section 305(g)
Inspection of existing construction (including
change of occupancy or moving to a new location)

Demolition Permit

Inspections for which no fee is specifically indicated
Additional plan review required by changes,
additions or revisions to approved plans . . .
Investigation Fee:
A. For property owner, building on private
property, for personal use only
B. Ail others

$30.00

Over 100.000 cubic yards

$30.00 for building
inspection, plus
$30.00 for each regulated trade for
which an inspection is required or
requested, not to
exceed $120.00
total
$30.00 (no charge if
demolition is done
in conjunction with
a permit for new
construction)

Grading Permit Fee
$20.00
$20.00 for the first 100 cubic yards
plus $7.00 for each additional 100
cubic yards.
$83.00 for thefirst1000 cubic yards
plus $6.00 for each additional 1000
cubic yards
$137.00 for the first 10.000 cubic
yards plus $30.00 for each additional 10.000 cubic yards
$407.00 for the first 100,000 cubic
yards plus $20.00 for each additional 10.000 cubic yards.

(Ord. 1048 § 3, 1988)

$30.00 per hour
(minimum charge
— one-half hour)
$30 00 per hour
(minimum charge
— one-half hour)
50% of the building
permit fee, but not
over $500.00
200% of the building permit fee. but
not over $2,000.00

(Orel. 1048 § 2, 1988)
15.08.025

Appendix Chapter 7 adoptedAviation control towers.
Chapter 7 of the Appendix to the Uniform
Building Code is adopted as follows:
Chapter 7. Aviation Control Towers.
(Ord. 1059 § 1,1989)
15.08.030

Amendment of Table Nos. 70-A
and 70-B.
Table Nos. 70-A and 70-B of the Appendix of
the Uniform Building Code, as adopted by the
State of Utah, are amended to read as follows:
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(Salt Lake County 8-S9)

building or structure before the entire plans and specifications for the whole
building or structure have been submitted or approved, provided adequate information and detailed statements have been filed complying with all pertinent
requirements of this code. The holder of such permit shall proceed at his own risk
without assurance that the permit for the enure building or structure will be
granted.
(b) Retention of Plans, One set of approved plans, specifications and computations shall be retained by the building official for a period of not less than 90
days from date of completion of the work covered therein; and one set of approved
plans and specifications shall be returned to the applicant, and said set shall be
kept on the site of the building or work at all times during which the work
authorized thereby is in progress.
(c) Validity of Permit. The issuance or granting of a permit or approval of
plans and specifications shall not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of,
any violation of any of the provisions of this code or of any other ordinance of the
jurisdiction. No permit presuming to give authority to violate or cancel the
provisions of this code shall be valid.
The issuance of a permit based upon plans, specifications and other data shall
not prevent the building official from thereafter requiring the correction of errors
in said plans, specifications and other data, or from preventing building operations being carried on thereunder when in violation of this code or of any other
ordinances of this jurisdiction.
(d) Expiration, Every permit issued by the building official under the provisions of this code shall expire by limitation and become null and void if the
building or work authorized by such permit is not commenced within 180 days
from the date of such permit, or if the building or work authorized by such permit
is suspended or abandoned at any time after the work is commenced for a period
of 180 days. Before such work can be recommenced, a new permit shall be first
obtained so to do, and the fee therefor shall be one half the amount required for a
new permit for such work, provided no changes have been made or will be made
in the original plans and specifications for such work; and provided further that
such suspension or abandonment has not exceeded one year.
Any permittee holding an unexpired permit may apply for an extension of the
time within which he may commence work under that permit when he is unable to
commence work within the time required by this section for good and satisfactory
reasons. The building official may extend the time for action by the permittee for a
period not exceeding 180 days upon written request by the permittee showing that
circumstances beyond the control of the permittee have prevented action from
being taken. No permit shall be extended more than once. In order to renew action
on a permit after expiration, the permittee shall pay a new full permit fee.
(e) Suspension or Revocation. The building official may, in writing, suspend
or revoke a permit issued under the provisions of this code whenever the permit is
issued in error or on the basis of incorrect information supplied, or in violation of
any ordinance or regulation or any of the provisions of this code.
33
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upon written application filed by the original permittee not later than 180 days
after the date of fee payment.
Inspections
Sec. 305. (a) General. All construction or work for which a permit is required
shall be subject to inspection by the building official, and certain types of
construction shall have continuous inspection by special inspectors as specified in
Section 306.
A survey of the lot may be required by the building official to verify that the
structure is located in accordance with the approved plans. It shall be the duty of
the permit applicant to cause the work to be accessible and exposed for inspection
purposes. Neither the building official nor the jurisdiction shall be liable for
expense entailed in the removal or replacement of any material required to allow
inspection.
(b) Inspection Requests. It shall be the duty of the person doing the work
authorized by a permit to notify the building official that such work is ready for
inspection. The building official may require that every request for inspection be
filed at least one working day before such inspection is desired. Such request may
be in writing or by telephone at the option of the building official.
It shall be the duty of the person requesting any inspections required by this
code to provide access to and means for proper inspection of such work.
(c) Inspection Record Card. Work requiring a permit shall not be commenced
until the permit holder or his agent shall have posted an inspection record card in a
conspicuous place on the premises and in such position as to allow the building
official conveniently to make the required entries thereon regarding inspection of
the work. This card shall be maintained in such position by the permit holder until
final approval has been granted by the building official.
(d) Approval Required. No work shall be done on any part of the building or
structure beyond the point indicated in each successive inspection without first
obtaining the approval of the building official. Such approval shall be given only
after an inspection shall have been made of each successive step in the construction as indicated by each of the inspections required in Subsection (e).
There shall be a final inspection and approval on all buildings and structures
when completed and ready for occupancy or use.
(e) Required Inspections. Reinforcing steel or structural framework of any
part of any building or structure shall not be covered or concealed without first
obtaining the approval of the building official.
The building official, upon notification from the permit holder or his agent,
shall make the following inspections and shall either approve that portion of the
construction as completed or shall notify the permit holder or his agent wherein
the same fails to comply with this code:
1. FOUNDATION INSPECTION: To be made after trenches are excavated
and forms erected and when all materials for the foundation are delivered on the
job. Where concrete from a central mixing plant (commonly termed "transit
mixed") is to be used, materials need not be on the job.
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UNIFORM BUILDING CODE

2. CONCRETE SLAB OR UNDER-FLOOR INSPECTION: To be made
after all m-slab or under-floor building service equipment, conduit, piping
accessories and other ancillary equipment items are in place but before an\
concrete is poured or floor sheathing installed, including the subfloor.
3. FRAME INSPECTION: To be made after the roof, all framing, fire
blocking and bracing are in place and all pipes, chimneys and vents are complete
and the rough electrical, plumbing, and heating wires, pipes, and ducts are
approved.
4. LATH AND/OR GYPSUM BOARD INSPECTION: To be made after all
lathing and gypsum board, interior and exterior, is in place but before any
plastering is applied or before gypsum board joints and fasteners are taped and
finished
5. FINAL INSPECTION: To be made after finish grading and the building is
completed and ready for occupancy.
(f) Other Inspections. In addition to the called inspections specified above,
the building official may make or require other inspections of any construction
work to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this code and other laws
which are enforced by the code enforcement agency.
(g) Reinspections. A reinspection fee may be assessed for each inspection or
reinspection when such portion of work for which inspection is called is not
complete or when corrections called for are not made.
This subsection is not to be interpreted as requiring reinspection fees the first
time a job is rejected for failure to comply with the requirements of this code, but
as controlling the practice of calling for inspections before the job is ready for
such inspection or reinspection.
Reinspection fees may be assessed when the permit card is not properly posted
on the work site, the approved plans are not readily available to the inspector, for
failure to provide access on the date for which inspection is requested, or for
deviating from plans requiring the approval of the building official.
To obtain a reinspection. the applicant shall file an application therefor in
writing upon a form furnished for that purpose and pay the reinspection fee in
accordance with Table No. 3-A.
In instances where reinspection fees have been assessed, no additional inspection of the work will be performed until the required fees have been paid.
Special Inspections

Sec. 306. (a) General. In addition to the inspections required by Section 305,
the owner shall employ a special inspector during construction on the following
types of work:
1. CONCRETE: During the taking of test specimens and placing of all
reinforced concrete and pneumatically placed concrete.
EXCEPTIONS: 1. Concrete for foundations conforming to minimum requirements of Table No. 29-A or for Group R. Division 3 or Group M, Division 1
Occupancies, provided the building official finds that a special hazard does not
exist.
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premises of a fabricator registered and approved by the building official to
perform such work without special inspection. The certificate of registration shall
be subject to revocation by the building official if it is found that any work done
pursuant to the approval is in violation of this code. The approved fabricator shall
submit a Certificate of Compliance that the work was performed in accordance
with the approved plans and specifications to the building official and to the
engineer or architect of record. The approved fabricator's qualifications shall be
contingent on compliance with the following:
1. The fabricator has developed and submitted a detailed fabrication procedural
manual reflecting key quality control procedures which will provide a basis for
inspection control of workmanship and the fabricator plant.
2. Verification of the fabricator's quality control capabilities, plant and personnel as outlined in the fabrication procedural manual shall be by an approved
inspection or quality control agency.
3. Periodic plant inspections shall be conducted by an approved inspection or
quality control agency to monitor the effectiveness of the quality control
program.
4. It shall be the responsibility of the inspection or quality control agency to
notify the approving authority in writing of any change to the procedural manual.
Any fabricator approval may be revoked for just cause. Reapproval of the
fabricator shall be contingent on compliance with quality control procedures
during the past year.
Certificate of Occupancy
Sec. 307. (a) Use or Occupancy. No building or structure of Group A, E, I, H,
B or R, Division 1 Occupancy, shall be used or occupied, and no change in the
existing occupancy classification of a building or structure or portion thereof shall
be made until the building official has issued a Certificate of Occupancy therefor
as provided herein.
(b) Change in Use. Changes in the character or use of a building shall not be
made except as specified in Section 502 of this code.
(c) Certificate Issued. After final inspection when it is found that the building
or structure complies with the provisions of this code and other laws which are
enforced by the code enforcement agency, the building official shall issue a
Certificate of Occupancy which shall contain the following:
1. The building permit number.
2. The address of the building.
3. The name and address of the owner.
4. A description of that portion of the building for which the certificate is
issued.
5. A statement that the described portion of the building complies with the
requirements of this code for the group and division of occupancy and the
use for which the proposed occupancy is classified.
6. The name of the building official.
(d) Temporary Certificate. If the building official finds that no substantial
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hazard will result from occupanc\ of any building or portion thereof before the
same is completed, he may issue a temporary Certificate of Occupancx for the use
of a portion or portions of a building or structure prior to the completion of the
entire building or structure.
(e) Posting. The Certificate of Occupancy shall be posted in a conspicuous
place on the premises and shall not be removed except by the building official.
(f) Revocation, The building official may. in writing, suspend or revoke a
Certificate of Occupancy issued under the provisions of this code whenever the
certificate is issued in error, or on the basis of incorrect information supplied, or
when it is determined that the building or structure or portion thereof is in
violation of any ordinance or regulation or any of the provisions of this code.

TABLE NO. 3-A—BUILDING PERMIT FEES
FEE

TOTAL VALUATION

$1.00 to 5500.00
$501.00 to $2,000.00
$2,001.00 to $25,000.00

$25,001.00 to $50,000.00

$50,001.00 to $100,000.00

5100,001.00 and up

$10.00

510 00 for the first S500.00 plus $ 1.50 for each additional
$100.00 or fraction thereof, to and including $2,000.00
$32.50 for the first $2,000.00 plus $6.00 for each additional $1,000.00 or fraction thereof, to and including
$25,000.00
$170.50 for the first $25,000.00 plus $4.50 for each
additional $1,000.00 or fraction thereof, to and including
$50,000.00
$283.00 for the first $50,000.00 plus $3.00 for each
additional $1,000.00 or fraction thereof, to and including
$100,000.00
$433.00 for the first 5100.000 00 plus $2.50 for each
additional $1,000.00 or fraction thereof

Other Inspections and Fees:
1. Inspections outside of normal business hours
(minimum charge—two hours)
2. Reinspection fee assessed under provisions of
Section 305 (g)
3. Inspections for which no fee is specifically
indicated
\
(minimum charge—one-half hour)
4. Additional plan review required by changes, additions
or revisions to approved plans
(minimum charge—one-half hour)

40

515 00 per hour
$15.00 each
$15.00 per hour
$15.00 per hour
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FRIDAY; MARCH 28/ 1986; 2:00 P.M.

WALLACE RAY NOBLE/
4 I

after having been first duly sworn to tell the truth/

5

the whole truth and nothing but the truth/ the witness was

6

examined and testified as follows:

7
8
9

MR. DEBRY: Now, before we start/ let me make a
note that I have returned the original exhibits which

10

related to the VanWagoner deposition and I have substituted

11

photocopies/ and I have returned the original to you ; Mr.

12

Maughan; is that correct?

13

MR. MAUGHAN:

14

MR. LARSEN:

15

That is correct.
Just for the record number eight was

mine.

16

MR. DEBRY:

Okay.

17
18
19

EXAMINATION
BY MR. DEBRY:

20

Q.

Would you state your name/ please?

21

A.

Full name is Wallace Ray Noble.

22

Q.

What is your address?

23

A.

1347 East 3930 south.

24

Q.

By whom are you employed?

1

Q.

What is your title?

2

A.

Chief Building Official*

3

Q.

What are your general duties and responsibilities?

4

A.

To oversee the building inspection division and

5

oversee the building inspectors and to regulate the

6

Building Code for Salt Lake County.

7

Q.

How many building inspectors do you have under you?

8

A.

Eleven/ I believe it is right now.

9

We are in the

process of hiring so it is.;.

10

Q.

Who is your immediate supervisor?

11

A.

Now/ Carl Erickson.

12

Q.

Were you here this morning when Mr. VanWagoner

13

testified?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Did you hear him testify that he had authority to

16

do electrical inspections as well as plumbing and other

17

things?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

That is true?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

So every inspector can inspect for anything?

22

that the way it works?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

Are you acquainted with Mr. Bartel?

Is

(Examination by Mr, DeBry)

Q.
2

10

We will come back to that,
Nowf calling your attention to December 6th# did

3

you come here to this building —

4

4252 South 700 East —

5

developers?

6

A.

by "this building" I mean

to have a meeting with the

Bob VanWagoner called roe on the radio and asked my

7

to come over.

When I came/ why ; he was here/ Mr. Bartel

8

and one other person.

9

Q.

Did the other person identify himself?

10

A.

The supervisor working with Bartel anyway.

11
12
13

I don't know who he was.
Q.

Prior to that meeting on December 6/ had you ever

been on these premises for an inspection?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Okay.

16
17
18
19

Prior to that meeting on December 6/ it was

your testimony you never met Bartel before?
A.

No/ I hadn't.

I may have seen him in the office

but never spoken to the man before.
Q.

Prior to December 6, had you ever had occasion to

20

look in the file at the documents/ the application and

21

permits that relate to this building?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Tell me what was said at this meeting.

24

Were any

minutes/ notes or memorandum kept of that meeting?

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)
notice with him.

11

So that was all that was done.

2 I

MR. DEBRY:

Let's go ahead and mark that now.

3

THE WITNESS:

All of this information I put here

4

was information I put on afterwards/ you know; who was what

5

and so forth.

6

(Exhibit 9 marked)

7
8

Q*

Showing you Exhibit 9/ is that the document

referred to that you worked on?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

At the December 6th meeting?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Okay.

Now; I notice on this document there is a

13

yellow slip of paper.

14

made?

15

A.

When was that yellow piece of paper

After your telephone call to me telling me about

16

the water problem; the fact that you didn't have any; and

17

so I just —

18

this so I remember where it was.

19

I'm just making a note to myself just added to

Really had nothing to do with this nor anything

20

below this point of —

well/ let me read for the record

21

what I actually felt on that day.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

I put on here, "4252 South 700 East is the

24

property address.

Date 12-6-85 time 3:10 p.m. I have

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)

12

fact that it is a commercial."
I did not check the work approved or disapproved.

2
3

Anything in violation I did not check.

All I used this

4

paper for was for the following: "Okay for temporary

5

occupancy for thirty days from this date.

6

all on-site and off-site improvements must be done or a

7

bond for the cost of the improvements must be given to the

8

County.

Completion of

" And signed it.

9

That was all I left at that time.

10

that was on this was just notes to myself.

Everything else

11

Q.

Notes you made at a later time?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Okay; now, tell me how long were you here on that

14

day on December 6, approximately?

15

A*

Maybe half hour or 45 minutes.

16

Q.

Tell me, when you came, what was said between you

17
18

and the other parties?
A.

They said —

indicated that there was some

19

question as to the long-term or, anyway, the interest rate

20

on the building whether or not the owner would be able to

21

get his commitment.

22

rate was or anything but said if they could get some kind

23

of temporary certificate or a certificate of occupancy for

24

to show the bank, why, they would be able to hold interest

Didn!t even discuss what the interest

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)

Q.

13

Now/ when they said that —

was that Mr. Bartel

2 I talking?
3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Did they say that was his personal loan or the

5

construction loan for the developer or did he say that was

6

a loan for the buyer?

7
8
9

A.

As I recall/ it was for the buyer.

loan.
Q.

Calling your attention to the yellow notes you

10

made on Exhibit 9 —

11

in red —

12

The long-term

A.

and if you look at the last line there

see if that refreshes your recollection.
His loan meaning —

yeah/ I know.

It says his

13

loan was in jeopardy if he couldn't get occupancy so we

14

gave him thirty days temporary occupancy.

15

assumed that to be the long-term loan for the buyer not the

16

builder.

17
18

Q.

Well/ I still

In short/ Bartel was telling you that the loan for

the buyer was in jeopardy?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Do you recall what/ if anything/ he said about any

21

penalty?

22

would be?

23
24

A.

If they lost this loan/ how much the penalty
How many points?
No.

That is why I say I don't know how much the

interest was or points.

I don't recall.

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)

1 I
2

Q.

13

Now/ when they said that —

was that Mr. Bartel

talking?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Did they say that was his personal loan or the

5

construction loan for the developer or did he say that was

6

a loan for the buyer?

7
8
9

A.

As I recall/ it was for the buyer.

loan.
Q.

Calling your attention to the yellow notes you

10

made on Exhibit 9 —

11

in red —

12

The long-term

A.

and if you look at the last line there

see if that refreshes your recollection.
His loan meaning —

yeah/ I know.

It says his

13

loan was in jeopardy if he couldn!t get occupancy so we

14

gave him thirty days temporary occupancy.

15

assumed that to be the long-term loan for the buyer not the

16

builder.

17
18

Q.

Well/ I still

In short/ Bartel was telling you that the loan for

the buyer was in jeopardy?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Do you recall what/ if anything/ he said about any

21

penalty?

22

would be?

23
24

A.

If they lost this loan/ how much the penalty
How many points?
No.

That is why I say I don't know how much the

interest was or points.

I don't recall.

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)

14

or that it would cost more money?
2 1

A.

It would cost more money,

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

Well/ at first I thought/ well I can't give you a

What was your response to that?

5

certificate of occupancy because the building is not

6

completed.

7

occupancy which I did —

8

can give a temporary occupancy for a length of time.

9

doesn't say how long.

10
11
12
13

I can give you a temporary certificate of

It

problems could be completed within that time period.
Q.

Now; on December 5th at the time you had this

conversation

—

A.

December 6th.

15

Q.

Sorry.

16

December 6th.

At that time did you have any plans in front of
you to look at?

Any approved plans?

18 J

A.

No, sir.

19 j

Q.

Did you ask to look at any plans?

20

A.

I looked at his permit which he had with him and

21

indicated to him the permit that he had was for a footing

22

and foundation only/ and I have a copy of it here.

23

have the original here.

24

I

So I give them thirty days figuring that the

14

17

and the ordinance backs me up —

Q.

That is

Well/ I

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)

15

1

original of the front copy of the four.

2

(Exhibit 10 marked)

3

Q.

I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 10.

4

that the document you are just talking about?

5

copy you discussed on the 6th?

Is

The permit

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Now, when you talked on the 6th, did you actually

8
9

have Exhibit 10 in your hand?
A.

Or you had his copy?

His copy is the hard copy.

I had his.

This comes

10

in tour parts.

Whevi it origirv^llY c o ^ s out, the buil&isvg

11

gets the hard copy which, on the back of it is the

12

inspection and, anyway, the har'' copy is the one that he

13

had with him and I said from what I see here, you have

14

nothing but a footing and foundation permit.

15

Q.

What did he say?

16

A.

I said please go to your records.

I would like a

17

copy of your records, so send me a copy of the completed

18

permit if you so have one.

19

Q.

What did he say?

20

A.

He indicated that the best of his knowledge he had

21

one.

Well, he would certainly send me the copy of his file

22

which he did.

23

Q.

When did he do that?

24

A.

February 5, 1986 with that letter.

25 I (Exhibit 11 marked)

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)

1 I
2
3

Q.

16

I show you Exhibit 11.

Is this the document you

referred to that he mailed to you?
A.

Yes.

That is the cover letter.

You have copies

4 J of it, and I don't remember, just really all it was was
repetitions of the things I already had.

In fact, he sent

6 I me copies of this.
7

Q.

When you say "this" you mean Exhibit 10?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Exhibit 10.

Some of the inspection reports, copy of

The originals of those ones I had but I don't

10

recall which ones but he sent me things I already had.

11

he didn't enlighten me to anything new.

12

Q.

Was there anything attached to Exhibit 11 to

13

change your opinion that he never at any time had a

14

building permit?

15
16
17

A.

So

Nothing changed my mind as far as I could tell.

He still didn't have a full permit.
Q.

Now, with respect to Exhibit 10, let me see if I

18

understand the procedure.

19

Exhibit 10, was that something that he carries around with

20

him or is that something hanging in the building?

21

A.

Was this copy that he had of

That is something —

well, it says it will be on

22

hand when the inspections are made so he can keep them with

23

him but when he calls for an inspection, it should be on

24

the premises.

If it is with him when he is on the premises,

25 I whv, there is no oroblem with that* so that we can verify

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)

1
2
3
4

17

that he has a permit.
Q.

Now, why did you issue a temporary certificate of

occupancy when he didn't have a building permit?
A.

The only reason would be because of —

5

him to verify his permit.

6

we was pressed for that time period.

7

there.

8

Q.

Same day?

9

A.

The —

I had told

He said he had a permit and that
He said it to be in

I don't remember if it was 5:00 or 5:30.

before the bank closed that night/ and

10

there was no way that either one of us could verify

11

anything in the short period of time.

12

hours/ maybe, at the most/ and he was talking about that

13

interest rate.

We had two or three

So I give him the temporary certificate knowing

14
15

that the building should have a final and would have a

16

final inspection and there would be no problems with it.

17

Q.

Now, on the 6th of December at the time you gave

18

him the temporary certificate/ did you conduct an

19

inspection of the premises?

20

A.

No/ I did not.

21

Q.

Now/ why didn't you?

22

A.

Well/ Bob VanWagoner was there and told me that he

23

had been —

24

was the set of stairs that were out in back that a truck

25

pulled in with, anrf T t-h-tnv — r,u,-~u

had inspected the building and my first concern

*« ^

1

V-

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)

34

process for getting a building permit in Salt Lake County?

3 I

A.

No.

Q.

If I wanted to get a building permit and I didn't

4

know anything about building/ what would I read to give me

5

the steps?

6

A*

We have got some handout documents in the office

7

that you could come in and pick up that would tell you the

8

procedure.

9

Q.

10

But as far as the official procedure/ you follow

the Uniform Building Code?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Okay.

Now/ are you familiar in your job as the

13

Building Official as to the procedure which a builder

14

follows to get an inspection on his property?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Let's go over, first of all/ what types of

17

inspections are required to have a building finally

18

approved.

19

A.

Footing/ foundation.

In some instances a

20

sub-rough plumbing which is the underground plumbing so

21

they can pour the concrete floors/ a rough inspection of

22

the mechanical/ building/ electrical and plumbing/ an

23

insulation inspection and a final inspection.

24

Q.

Okay.

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)

35

1 I plumbing and electrical.
2
3

Q.

Let's see if I got this right.

Did you say an

underfloor inspection?

4

A.

A sub-rough plumbing.

5

Q.

That is a sub-rough plumbing?

6

A.

Rough.

7

Q.

Did you say a frame inspection?

8

A.

Well

9

Q.

Is that required?

10

A.

A framing which is rough building is the same

11

thing.

12

Q.

Gypsum board inspections?

13

A.

We don!t require that.

14

Q.

So what you require are the footing inspection?

15

A.

Foundation.

16

Q.

Is that the same as a footing?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Footing is one inspection?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Foundation is a separate inspection?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And then a

23

A.

Maybe a sub-rough plumbing, depends on the

24

~

Is that correct?

Foundation?

—

contractor whether or not he wants one.

A lot of times

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)

1 I plumbing inspection.

36

That is why it can be done two ways.

2

Q.

What is meant by the term a full rough?

3

A.

When all the plumbing is installed throughout the

4

building, all the rough plumbing/ all the pipes, all the

5

vent system is in place.

6

Q.

Then the final inspection?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Now, is there any mechanical —

9
10

what about the

electrical inspection?
A.

Well, there is the rough building electrical/

11

mechanical and plumbing so that we call it the four roughs.

12

Those four rough inspections are required.

13

insulation inspection.

14
15

Q.

Then the

I have the building, the electrical/ the

mechanical and what is the fourth one?

16

A.

Plumbing._

17

Q.

Now, we had testimony this morning about

18

electrical inspections.

19

records whether any —

20

inspections.

21
22

Can you tell by looking at your
let's talk about the building

Were any footings inspections ever done on this
building?

23

A.

Yes, there were.

24

Q.

Would you show me that one?

?^ I

A.

We have two of them:

one on 10-23 and one on 10-26,

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)
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(Exhibits 19 and 20 marked)
Q.

I show you Exhibits 19 and 20.

Are these copies

of the footing inspections?
A.

Yes/ they are.

Q.

Now/ can you tell from your records whether any

foundation inspection was ever done?
A.

11-13 of '84.

(Exhibit 21 marked)
Q.

By the way, going back to Exhibits 19 and 20 f did

they pass that?
A.

Yes.

Q. Allright " Exhibit 21 this a copy of the foundation
inspection?
A.

Yes/ and it passed.

Q.

Can you tell from your records whether any rough

inspection or sub-rough was done?
A.

Sub-rough plumbing was approved on 11-14 of f 84.

(Exhibit 22 marked)
Q.

Is Exhibit 22 then a copy of the approval for the

sub-rough?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That is sub-rough plumbing?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was there a sub-rough on the mechanical?

(Examination by Mr, DeBry)
1
2
3
4
5
6

Q.

38

Now/ would that sub-rough 22/ did that include the

building?
A.

That is strictly plumbing.

That is underground

and marked as such under there.
Q.

Well/ is there a time that comes that people come

and look at the walls and braces?

7

A.

Yes/ that is the rough plumbing.

8

Q*

Do your notes reflect whether a full rough

9

inspection was ever done?

10

A.

I have no record of it.

11

Q.

That is a full rough for the building or full

12

rough for mechanical?

Either of those?

13

A.

Neither one of those.

14

Q.

Do you have any record of any sub-rough or full

15

rough for —

16

plumbing.

17

I'm sorry.

You did have a sub-rough for the

Do you have a full rough for the plumbing?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Now/ do you have any records that we haven't

20

talked about?

21

A.

The electrical inspector.

22

Q.

Other than the electrical?

23

A.

The electrical and I think you have —

24

don't know if you have this one or not.

well — I

That wasn't Bob

(Examination by Mr* DeBry)

1 I That was another electrical inspector*
2

39

Bob was probably

off that day so he made the inspection.

3 J (Exhibit 23 marked)
Q.

So Exhibit 23 is another electrical inspection

that was done?
6 I

A*

Yes.

7

Q.

That is a sub-rough electrical?

8

A.

Partial rough electrical.

9

Q.

Are there any other inspections that you have

10
11

notes of?
A.

I had one that was a reinspection required so he

12

didn't make —

this was a footing inspection and that was

13

one that didn't get made/ that was not approved.

14

(Exhibit 24 marked)

15

A.

Then there was a

16

Q.

I show you Exhibit 24 and ask you to tell me what

17

that is?

18

A.

Footing inspection that was not approved.

19

Q.

Does it say why it was not approved?

20

A.

It just says reinspection required.

21

was not ready.

22

Q.

Was it ever redone?

23

A.

Well, these other two would have.

24

Q.

19 and 20?

Evidently, it

(Examination by Mr- DeBry)

1 I probably.
2

The 26th.

This —

40

as you notice/ he put down

west end north side one-third of building and...

3

Q.

Do you know that that means?

4

A.

Evidently that was the portion that he was to look

5

at and it wasn't ready.

6

requested again and I assume that is the same one because

7

Ralph Reynolds approved that one.

8
9
10

Q.

Okay.

inspections
A.

Then on 10-26 —

yeah —

it was

So my question is: are there any other

—

There was a stop work order put on because of the

11

flood control impact fee check that was returned to our

12

office.

13

that/ you know/ whether or not that was ever verified or

14

resubmitted or what.

15

(Exhibit 25 marked)

16
17
18

Q.

And/ consequently/ I don't know what happened with

I show you Exhibit 25 and ask you to tell us what

that is.
A.

A stop work order as per flood control and I have

19

no idea what really what it was for.

I'm assuming it was

20

because of the check but I don't really know.

21

Q.

Who signed it there?

22

A.

Deceased inspector so I can't even ask him what he

23

looked at.

24

Q.

He past away a couple of two years ago.

Do you know if the stop work order has ever been

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)

1 I
2

A.

I don't know.

41

He is probably the only one that

can tell me.

3

Q.

How is a stop order lifted?

4

A*

By the person that put it on.

5

Q.

You have no record of it having been lifted?

6

A*

I have no record of that.

7

Q«

My question is different:

8

you have no written

notification that the stop work order has ever been lifted?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Just to summarize —

I want to summarize the

11

inspections that were not done as I understand it.

12

has never been, well; there has never been a final

13

inspection of any kind; is that correct?

There

14

A.

Not according to my records there hasn't.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

That was going to be the case with every one of

17
18

your questions if you ask them that way.
Q.

Well/ there has never been a full rough inspection

19

on the building or the electrical or the mechanical or the

20

plumbing; is that correct?

21

A.

Not as far as I know.

22

Q.

As far as a sub-rough inspection, we did find one

23

for plumbing but nothing for mechanical or electrical or

24

the building; is that correct?

^c

*

Ma11

- \m\i rHfl

HAVP

some, well# sub-rouqh now.

I

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)
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1

Q.

Sub-rough?

2

A.

Right.

3

Q.

Nothing for mechanical.

4

A.

Oh, yeah.

5

Q.

Nothing for mechanical and nothing for the

6

building?

7

A.

Right.

8

Q.

What is the cost of a building permit?

9
10

I found one for plumbing?

Yes.
Is it only

$74.00?
A*

Based on the square foot valuation of the building,

11

it is indicated in Chapter 3 of the Building Code.

12

the valuation is made up, a thousand square foot building

13

and it is just using some numbers here —

14

thousand square foot/ it would cost $20.00 a square foot

15

times the —

16

fee or a number and put it into the fee schedule in Chapter

17

3 of the Building Code which tells you how much the

18

building permit itself is.

19
20

Q.

Once
—

if it is a

twenty times the thousand and come up with a

Do you know if anyone has ever determined the

amount of the fee for the building permit?

21

A.

Yes.

It is on the front part of Exhibit Number 12.

22

Q.

Show me.

23

A.

Right up here on the right.

24

Q.

So the building permit fee is $1,075?

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)
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A.

Yes.

2 I

Q.

Did you ever get a response to Exhibit 27?

3

A.

This letter number?

4

Q.

11.

5

A.

Numbered Exhibit 11.

6

Q*

Now/ during these conversations was anything said

7

between you and Mr. Thurgood on the subject of whether or

8

not they had a building permit?

9
10
11

A.

Well/ again/ if I did/ I would have just told them

that as far as my records were concerned/ we had no permit.
Q.

As I recall your earlier testimony/ it was that

12

when you came here/ they showed you a piece of paper that

13

was only a footing and foundation permit?

14
15
16
17

A.

Yes.

I mean that is all I had was a footing and

foundation but no full permit.
Q.

Did I understand correctly/ did he tell you that

he thought he had a full permit somewhere at home?

18

A.

Yes, he did.

19

Q.

Tell me as nearly as you can his exact words on

20

If he didn't/ Mr. Bartel did.

So

that subject as nearly as you can recall.

21

A.

I really

22

Q.

In substance.

23

A.

Well/ as far as I could tell and recall, he said

24

~

I'm sure we have got the permit.

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)
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1

night or the next day or the next day and look to see what

2

your office records showed?

3
4
5
6
7

A.

Well/ I don't remember when that conversation was.

Sometime/ yes/ we looked to see what records we got.
Q.

You had a conversation to that effect on the 6th

of December.
A.

Isn't that when he assured

Yes, after that/ yes, yes.

—

Well/ I don't know if

8

I had had a conversation with him on the 6th of December

9

but very shortly after I did.

10

Q.

Yes.

Isn't the 6th of December when he showed you his

11

Exhibit 10?

12

A.

Mr. Bartel did.

13

Q.

Mr. Bartel?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

After Mr. Bartel showed you Exhibit 10/ and

16

assured you that he had another full building permit

17

somewhere else/ did you go back and look at your records?

18

A.

Yes, we started searching for them.

19

Q.

How long after the 6th of December did you conduct

20

a search?

21

A.

The next day.

22

Q.

What did you do when you didn't find anything the

23
24
25

We found —

didn't find anything.

next day?
A.

Well/ that is when I started the procedure of

trvina to aet ahold of somebody.

(Examination by Mr. DeBry)
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1

Q»

Anything else you did?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

So when you couldn't get the building permit the

4

next day; eventually you mailed Exhibit 27; is that correct?

5

A.

Yes,

6

Q.

Well/ did you do anything in between December

that is right.

7

when you looked at your records and couldn't find the

8

building permit/ and January 14?

9
10

A.

I donft recall what I did.

1,

I don't have anything

in writing anyway.

11

Q.

Now/ we were talking about inspections earlier and

12

there are some inspections that had never been done.

13

possible at this point with the building in the stage you

14

see it done/ to go back and do those inspections?

15

possible to do a full rough inspection?

16
17

A.

Is it

Is it

For all practical purposes/ I would say/ yes/ I

have already done that.

18

Q.

You looked behind the walls?

19

A.

Well/ not behind the walls but as far as what is

20

meant by the term between the ceiling and the floors above/

21

why; you can get a good idea of what is meant by the term

22

going on with a building.

23
24
25 I

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

it?

You were able to do a portion or a part of

E X H I B I T - D

I L|S'
DAVID E. YOCOM
Acting Salt Lake County Attorney
By: Paul G. Maughan (No. 2124)
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants Salt Lake County
and Wallace R. Noble
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
Telephone: 363-7900
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and
JOAN DEBRY.
Plaintiffs,
-vsCASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general
partnership: DEL K. BARTEL;
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL;
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT CO.;
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a
general partnership; LEE
ALLEN BARTEL; SALMON AND
ALDER, INC.; WILLIAM TRIGGER
d.b.a. TRIGGER ROOFING;
ZEPHYR ELECTRIC. INC.;
SAWYER GLASS CO.. INC.;
TRIAD SERVICES CO.. INC.;
VALLEY MORTGAGE CORP.. INC.;
RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE
CORP.; WALLACE R. NOBLE,
individually and in his
official capacity; SALT LAKE
COUNTY WORKS DEPT.; SALT
LAKE COUNTY; SCOTT MCDONALD
REALTY, INC.; and, STANLEY
POSTMA,

DEFENDANTS' SALT LAKE
COUNTY AND WALLACE RAY
NOBLE RESPONSES TO
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST
FOR ADMISSIONS AND
INTERROGATORY

Civil No. C86-553
Judge Richard Moffat

Defendants.

Defendants Salt Lake County and Wallace Ray Noble respond
to

plaintiffs' Request

for Admissions

and

Interrogatory

as

follows:

Fil F RfiPY

RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
REQUEST No. 1:
the

building

at

Admit that the stop work order affecting

4252

South

700 East

(Exhibit

34 to Noble

deposition) has never at any time been withdrawn, lifted or
revoked^
RESPONSE:
REQUEST

Admit,

Mo.

2:

Admit

that

Cascade

Enterprises

and/or

Cascade Construction constructed the building at 4252 South 700
East in violation of a valid stop work order, and that the stop
work order has never been lifted or revoked.
RESPONSE: Admit.
REQUEST No. 3:

Admit that no final building permit was

ever issued to Cascade Construction and/or Cascade Enterprises
for the building at 4252 South 700 East.
RESPONSE:

Admit.

REQUEST No. 4:

Admit that neither Cascade Enterprises nor

Cascade Construction ever obtained any "approved plans" for the
building at 4252 South 700 East as reguired by Section 2-1-1,
Salt

Lake

County

Ordinances

of

January

14,

1983

(Uniform

Building Code §303(a).
SESPONSE:

Admit,

but see Answer

to

Interrogatory.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY
With respect to any response to the foregoing reguest for
admissions

Which

is

anything

other

than

an

ungualified

affirmative, describe in reasonable detail the factual basis
for your denial.

ANSWER:
submitted

Salt
to

it

Lake
for

County,

the

however,

construction

did

of

the

approve

plans

footings

and

foundation of the building located at 4252 South 700 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah, on November 16, 1984
day of December, 1986.

DATED th3

DEFENDANTS SALT LAKE COUNTY AND
WALLACE RAY NOBLE

WALLACE RAY NOBLE
SUBSCRIBED

and

SWORN

to

before

me

th is

V*

day

December, 1986.

NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing in
Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

of
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Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule III of the Rules of Practice in the Third
Judicial

District

Court

for

the

District

of

Utah,

Paul

G.

FILE C0P1

Maughan, attorney for defendants Salt Lake County and Wallace
Ray Noble, hereby certifies that the original of Defendants1
Response to Plaintiffs' Admissions and Interrogatory, and this
Certificate

of

Service

were

mailed,

postage

prepaid,

day of December, 1986, to the following:
Robert B. Hansen
325 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and
Robert J. DeBry
Robert J. DeBry & Associates
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
The undersigned
copies
Service

of

the

were

further

foregoing
mailed,

certifies

Response

postage

that true and correct

and

prepaid,

this

Certificate

this V

December, 1986, to the following:
Jeffrey K. Woodbury
Walter Kennedy III
WOODBURY, BETTILYON AND KESLER
2677 East Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
George A. Hunt
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mark A. Larson
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN
310 South Main Street, #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jeff Silvestrini
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

day

of
of

Steven R. McMurray
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
The Hermes Building
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
D. Michael Nielsen
Session Place
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Valden Livingston
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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Plaintiffs,
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UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT CO.;
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general partnership; LEE
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Defendants.

Defendants

Salt

Lake County and Wallace R. Noble answer

Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories as follows:

INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
have had with

Identify each conversation which you

any partners, officers, agents or employees of

Cascade Construction and/or Cascade Enterprises on the subject
of obtaining
700

East

"approved

as

Ordinances

of

plans" for the building

required

by

Section

January

14,

1983,

2-1-1,
and

at 4252 South

Salt

Section

Lake

303(a)

County
of

the

Uniform Building Code.
ANSWER:
occasions,
twice

at

I have
twice

his

at

office

spoken
the

to

site,

at

Del

Bartel

on

once

during

a deposition, and

715 East

at

3900 South.

three times to Dale Thurgood on the phone.

least

I have

four

spoken

The essence of each

conversation was that I told them to get a building permit.

In

order to get a permit, the building plans must be approved.
I do not
present

on

recall

those

any

specific dates or times, or who was

occasions.

I believe,

however,

I spoke to

Bartel on December 6, 7, 1984 and at my first deposition taken
by Mr. DeBry.
INTERROGATORY

NO.

2:

Identify

each

document

sent

to or

received from Cascade Construction, Cascade Enterprises, or any
of

their

subject
2-1-1,

partners,

of obtaining
Salt

Lake

officers,
"approved

County

agents,

or

employees

plans" as required

Ordinances

of

January

by

on

the

Section

14, 1983, and

Section 303(a) of the Uniform Building Code.
ANSWER:
(a)

On

Construction

January
to

inform

14

a

letter

them they had

was

sent

to

only received

Cascade
a footing

and foundation permit

and

necessary requirements.
(b)

A

February

letter

they would

have to comply with the

See Deposition Exhibit 27.

was

received

11, 1986, explaining

from

their

Cascade

Construction

reasons, in answer to my

January 14th letter, for noncompliance.

See Deposition Exhibit

11.
(c)

A

letter

was

received

from

Cascade

Construction

in

February, 1986 explaining why a check was enclosed for a permit
fee of $1,075.00.
(d)

See Deposition Exhibit 26.

A letter dated March 19, 1986 was sent by Ray Noble to

Del Bartel and Robert DeBry listing some of the problems found
after Mr. DeBry

asked

building

included

which

if an inspection would
that

a

permit

was

be made on his
required.

See

Deposition Exhibit 33.
(e)

On October 2, 1986, I received a letter from Cascade

Construction stating they had complied with the requirements of
the March 19th letter. See letter attached.
On

the

original

plan

check

and

list

plumbing,

mechanical

submitted.

See Deposition Exhibit 12.

INTERROGATORY NO. 3:
have had with

electrical

a

note
plans

was

made

were

to

that
be

Identify each conversation which you

any partners, officers, agents or employees of

Cascade Construction and/or Cascade Enterprises on the subject
of obtaining
Salt

a building

permit as required

Lake County Ordinances

of January

by Section 2-1-1,

14, 1983, and

301(a) of the Uniform Building Code.
ANSWER:

See answer to Interrogatory No. 1.

Section

INTERROGATORY
received

from

NO.

Cascade

4:

Identify

Construction

each

document

and/or

Cascade

sent

to or

Enterprises

or any of their partners, officers, agents, or employees on the
subject of obtaining a building permit as required
2-1-1,

Salt

lake

County

Ordinances

of

January

by Section

14, 1983, and

Section 301(a) of the Uniform Building Code.
ANSWER:

See answer to Interrogatory No. 2.

INTERROGATORY NO. 5:
have

had with

Identify each conversation which you

any partners, officers, agents or employees of

Cascade Construction and/or Cascade Enterprises on the subject
of issuing, receiving, enforcing, or revoking a stop work order.
ANSWER:

None.

INTERROGATORY
received

from

NO.

Cascade

6:

Identify

Construction

each

document

and/or

Cascade

sent

to or

Enterprises

on the subject of issuing, receiving, enforcing, or revoking a
stop work order.
ANSWER:
Construction

On November 29, 1984, a letter was sent to Cascade
stating

tha

if

the

check

for

$2,677.67 was not

made good by December 7, 1984, a Stop Work would be placed on
the development.

See letter attached.

A Stop Work Order was

placed on the job by Robert Ferguson on December 18, 1984.

See

Deposition Exhibit 25.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Describe each inspection conducted by

any Salt Lake County agent or employee on the building at 4252
South 700 East with respect to each such inspection state:
(a)

Why the inspection was conducted by request;

(b)

By whom the inspection was conducted;

(c) When the inspection was conducted;
(d)

Purpose of the inspection;

(e)

Identify any conversation which occurred

during the

course of the construction;
(f)

The findings of the inspection;

(g) Whether the inspectors viewed the approved plans, the
inspection card, and the permit in connection with the
inspection and if not why not;
(h)

Identify

each

document

which

relates

to

each

inspection.
ANSWER:
(a) Footing inspection - Ralph Reynolds - 10-23-84.
To check for any problems in the work being done.
Work was approved for south and east section.
(b)

Footing inspection - Jerry Hansen - 10-24-84.
To check for any problems in the work being done.
A reinspection was called for.

(c)

Spot footing - Ralph Reynolds - 10-26-84.
To check for any problems in the work being done.
Work was approved.

(d)

Foundation inspection - Ralph Reynolds - 11-13-84.
To check for any problems in the work being done.
Work approved.

(e)

Sub rough plumbing or underground - Stan Hansen.
To check for any problems in the work being done.
Work approved.

such

(f)

Rough electrical - Rick Werner - 9-16-85.
To check for any problems in the work being done.
Work approved.

(g)

Rough electrical - Bob Van Wagoner - 9-24-85.
To check for any problems in the work being done,

(h)

Rough electrical - Bob Van Wagoner - 11-7-85.
To check for any problems in the work being done.
Work checked incomplete.
Needed to be grounded to main cold water pipe.
Needed to sign for power-to-panel,

(i)

Rough electrical - Bob Van Wagoner 11-18-85.
To check for any problems in the work being done.
Work approved,

(j)

Partial

final

building,

electrical,

plumbing

&

mechanical 0 Bob Van Wagoner - 12-6-85.
To check for any problems in the work being done.
Work approved subject to the following:
Will

need

to

check

with

Ray

Noble

for

building

clearance.
Plumbing - 2 sinks to be completed.
Heating - completed except grills.
Building

-

back

stairs

from

the

top

foor

to

be

installed on west side outside.
Electrical - Completed except 4 overhead lights and
breakers on order, to be installed.
Subject to all permits.

Subject to Zoning & Conditional Use.
Landscaping to be completed.
(k)

All

inspections

were

made

upon

the

request

of

the

builder.
(1)

No

specific

place,

if

conversations
any,

at

the

can

time

be

recalled

these

that

took

inspections

were

performed.
(m)

No plans were

ever

and

foundation;

the

site;

viewed
than

it

other

the inspection

is

on the

a

approved

not

known

than

for

card was available at

if

it was

at

site; no permit was ever

footings

and

footings

foundation

permit

all

times

issued

other

so

they

were

obviously not present on the site.
(n)

Inspection

documents

relating

to

inspections

made of

the building have previously been given to plaintiffs
as

exhibits

exhibits

to

2,

addition,

4,

the

Mr.
5f

Noble's

7,

following

8,

19,

three

deposition.

Numbered

20,

25.

23, and

inspection

reports are

produced herewith and constitute the total
reports

of

the

County

in this

matter.

In

inspection

Any

further

information desired by plaintiffs is equally available
to them by reviewing said documents.
INTERROGATORY

NO.

8:

State

why

no

further

inspections

(other than those described in No. 7 above) were accomplished.
ANSWER:

They were not called for.

INTERROGATORY
reason

why

the

NO.
stop

9:

Describe

work

order

in reasonable
(Exhibit

34

detail

to

the

each
Noble

deposition) was not enforced.
ANSWER:
flood

The

impact

stop work

fees had

order was

not

issued

been paid.

No

because

required

follow-up was

ever

instigated by the building inspectors.
INTERROGATORY
deposition,
temporary

NO.

10;

On

Page

51

and

52

defendant

Noble

testified

that

certificate

of

occupancy

(Exhibit

had

ever

been

issued

to Cascade

the

Noble

the day after

deposition) was issued, Mr. Noble determined
permit

of

34

to

the

Noble

that no building

Construction.

State

each reason why the temporary certificate of occupancy was not
immediately withdrawn or revoked at that time.
ANSWER:
that

the

At the time of issuance I was told by Del Bartel
building

would

be

finished

in

the

30

days.

The

issuance of a permit and the completion of the building could
have been done in that time so no reason for withdrawing of or
revoking was presented until a later date when problems became
apparent.
DATED this

V

' day of December, 1986.
WALLACE R. NOBLE for himself
and on behalf of Salt Lake
County

WALLACE R. NOBLE

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

County of Salt Lake

WALLACE R. NOBLE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes
and says: That he has read the foregoing Answers to Plaintiffs1 First Interrogatories and declares that they are true to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

'/&*#,

WALLACE R. NOBLE
SUBSCRIBED

and

SWORN

to

before

me

this

v

day

December, 1986.

"ixLutb tzJ&tuik^
NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing ,in
Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:
1041G

of

OBJECTION TO DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
Defendants, by and through their attorney of record, object
to

the

definitions

and

instructions

contained

in plaintiffs'

first interrogatories to defendants on the ground that they are
overly

broad,

detail which

burdensom,
goes

beyond

oppressive

and

the plaintiffs'

call

for

unnecessary

legitimate

needs of

discovery in this action.
Defendants have nevertheless answered

said

as completely, openly, and fully as possible.
not given as requested
tion

of

additional

question,
furnished
based

or

Any information

is because defendants have no recollecinformation

because

interrogatories

business

regarding

records

have

the

previously

or are herewith .furnished and additional

upon

them

is

available

O

in
been

information

to or ascertainable

j

plaintiffs.
DATED this

equally

subject

day of December, 1986.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

By.
PAUL G. MAUGHAtf
U
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake County and
Wallace R. Noble

by

CASCADE ENTERPRISES
715 East 3900 South, Suite #212
Salt Lake City, Utah

H

84107

September 11, 1986

Salt Lake County Public Works
Development Service Division
Mr. Wallace R. Noble
2035 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
RE:

Office Building - 4252 South State

Dear Mr. Noble:
I am writing this letter in an effort: to end our involvement
with the above referenced project. In your letter of March 19, 1986
you addressed a series of punch list items that needed to be completed.
I will endevor to address these itanos in the same order as you listed
than.
1. Handicap hardware has been installed and canpleted in
accordance with county code.
2. We have been inforired by DeBry that any partitions he
is willing to accept have been installed by his firm.
3. All fixtures have been sealed at point of contact with
walls and floors.
4. All ceiling tiles are installed and in place.
5. All electrical junction boxes have had the appropriate
cover plates installed.
6.

The exterior air conditioner units have been installed
and completed by Samon and Alder and have been fully
operational all summer.

7.

There are no roof leaks or water leaks that have not been
repaired. There is no water leakage of any sort of which
W8 are aware.

8. All stairways both interior and exterior are anchored and
complete to the extent we were allowed to ccnplete the
work prior to having our people ordered off the job (see
attached statement frcm Kerry McQueen).

Mr. Wallace R. Noble
September 11, 1986
Page Two

9.

The main stairs in the foyer are in fact 12'8" in rise
and the 8" variance was checked by Gil Claderen and
approved and initialed as accepted by Jay Bishop.

10.

All footings of the building are covered and protected
with back fill.

11.

The window on the east side of the building was installed
by Sawyer Glass Canpany and inspected by a Salt Lake
County inspector and passed as being appropriately
installed.

12.

The suspended
as originally
to access the
access by Mr.

13.

The light fixtures have not been reanchored due to the
fact that the electrician was ordered off the job by
Mr. DeBry. Written verification by Zepher Electric
can by supplied upon request.

14.

We attempted to install draft stops between the floor
and ceiling and the ceiling and the roof and our sub,
John Swaney was ordered off the project by Mr. DeBry.
Letter attached.

ceiling has not been anchored other than
installed by Building Systems. We attempted
ceiling for additonal work and was denied
DeBry.

15. & 16. Our engineer, Mr. Stan Postman of Bingham Engineering
assures us that all items are complete as called for and
will supply you any information you require directly.
17.

We have installed all bolts in girder saddles as required.

18.

Electrical sub breaker branch panels have been installed
per instructions frcm Salt Lake County officials.

19.

All grading and landscape has been conpleted and accepted
by Salt Lake County and DOT.

20.

The fence has been anchored and installation canpleted.

21.

Drive approach, curb, gutter, sidewalk and canbination
box has been completed and accepted by Salt Lake County
and DOT.

22.

The front foyer was built and delivered for installation
as per plans and specs by Sawyer Glass. Upon delivery
DeBrysf rejected the foyer and insisted on redesigning
the foyer to their own specs.

Mr. Wallace R. Nobxe
September 11, 1986
Page Three -

23.

Please see items 15 and 16.

24.

The plans were ccnpleted and the building built according
to corrected plans. The County should have these in their
files. We are here with including the as builts on electrical layout and floor and wall plans.

25.

The on site and off site improvements were bonded as
required. These improvements have since been completed
and a release of bond requested.

26.

We originally filled out and conpleted a permit application.
We have furnished a copy of this application to the County
which also included the signatures of County officials. We
have paid all fees to all departments of the County as
requested for the insurance of permits through all phases
of the permit process. It was never our intension or
understanding that \*& were building without a permit.

At this point in time we feel we have done everything humanly
possible to ccrrply with every request made by Salt Lake County and are
herewith asking for a release frcm our responsibility regarding any
further permits or certificates of occupancy.
Sincerely

Dale Thurgood
DT:leh
enclosures

SALT LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES DIVISION
2033 South State
Salt .Lake City, Utah 84115
Phone:535-7511

COMMISSIONER

BART BARKER
DtRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS
ASSODATf DIRECTOR
If
hiblic Works
Romnty M. Stewart
535-5448
Administntivt Support &
Buiinexs License
Diana Jones
535-759*
Building Inspection
Wallace R. Noble
535-7511
Devtlopsnent Engineering
Brent Tidwell
535-5448
land Use Information
Robert Cates
535-7004

November 2 9 , 19 84
CERTIFIED KAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

DONALD G. SPENCER
Professional Engineer
County Engineer
DIRECTOR

KEN JONES

Cascade C o n s t r u c t i o n
301 West 5400 S o u t h
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84107

Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:

Returned Check #1089 (Development Impact Fee,
Plaza Office Building, Receipt #117490) PL-83-2124

Gentlemen:
On October 19, 19 84, your check in the amount of $2,677,67
was returned to Salt Lake County by United Bank. (Copy attache
This check was received as payment for the development impact
fee assessed to your project/ the Plaza Office Building at
4240 South 700 East.
Mrs. Lucille Reese, Building Inspection Cashier, has contactec
your office several times to request that the check be replaced. To date she has had no response to her request.

We are most anxious to settle this matter and avoid delays to
your project. Please contact Lucille Reese at 488-5000, at
your earliest convenience, to resolve this issue•
Yours truly,

fc^lidH

L. Brent Tidwell
Engineering Section Administrator
LBT/ckc
Attachment
cc: Project File, Ken Jones, Kent Lewis, Lucille Reese
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WORK
PPROVED
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ROUTINE
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D footings

^underground

D concrete

D P to P

D foundation
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D steel
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D frame

D clearance

D columns
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D final

D progress

D

D Do not proceed with work
D Make necessary corrections
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D prior violations corrected
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items listed below will be
r
inspected at next regular inspectio

D Work must De completed with a call fct reinspection within,
D UNABLE TO MAKE INSPECTION

COMMENTS

C A L L E D

D complete

RESULTS OF
INSPECTION
see
comments for
explanat.on

^

D Cannot locate property.
D House locked.

D issued Stop Order

D Double Fee

D Reinspection Required

D Reinspection Fee Required

_ days

D Admittance refused.
D Approved plans not available.
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D ROUTINE
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concrete

D PtoP

D prior violations corrected
n items listed below will be
inspected at next regular inspection

D Make necessary corrections
D Work must be completed with a call for reinspection within ,

G Double Fee
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Acting Salt Lake County Attorney
r.y
Paul ." Maughan (No, 2.1.24)
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Salt Lake County Defendants
and Wallace R. Noble
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
i
Telephone: 363-7900
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND

I-'IIR

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT J. DEBRY and
JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs.
-vsCASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL;
DALE THURGOOD: ROBERT G. HILL;
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION. c
general partnership; LEi:
ALLEN BARTEL; SALMON AND
ALDER. INC.; WILLIAM TRIGGER
d.b.a. TRIGGER ROOFING;
ZEPHYR ELECT
SAWYER GLASS _.,. . . .-. ;
TRIAD SERVICES CO.. INC.;
VALLEY MORTGAGE CORP., INC.;
RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE
CORP.; WALLACE R. NOBLE,
individually and in his
official capacity; SALT LAKE
COUNTY WORKS DEPT.; SALT
LAKE COUNTY; SCOTT McDONALD
REALTY, I N C ; and, STANLEY
POSTMA.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Judge Richard Moffat

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule III of the Rules of Practice in the Third
Judicial

District

Court

for

the

District

of

Utah,

Paul

G.

«r,G.
? .v

ornev

Nobi*

for

nereby
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... .

iu:

-. *~

: rv

County

3^
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C-^-A^C

. . -•

.eI

prepaid,

11

~a* -

tr*^ _
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of

i i • : 'u :i

^ C D e r L L, . r l a n s e n
"5C0 F c S t

Robert . . . -L:;*. :. : ..sr.ci.r.js
4252 South 700
Salt Lake City
84107
da
A t t o r n e y s for P l a i n t i f f s

J. he
copies
were

''"r \ . : : ' e u
o^

ma.:-.

miiiiei.

ueitiiieb

.,; e n o i n g Answers and t h i s
rt Jh
:;-:stage

prepaid,

this

/

Lad.
C e r t i f i c a t e o £ s e r vi c e
day

of

December,

J e f £ r e y K. W o o d b u r y
W a l t e r Kennedy 111
WOODBURY, BETTILYON AND KESLER
2 677 East P a r l e y ' s Way
Salt Lake C i t y, I J t ah 84 ] 0 9
G e o r g e A. Hunt
SNOW, C H R I S T E N S E N «l- MA RT I NKAT.I
10 E x c h a n g e Place
Salt Lake CI ty.
Utnh (34111
Mark A .

Larson

DART, ADAMSON & PARKE1J
310 S o u t h Main S t r e e t , #1330
S a l t Lake Cit.v, Utfiti R4101
Jeff S i l v e s t r i n i
C O H N E , R A P P A P O R T & SEGAL
66 E x c h a n g e Place
S a 11 L a k e C i t y, U t a h 8 411 1

1986,

Steven R. McMurray
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
"•;*-' Hermes Building
4SB East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111
.j. Michael Nie*.;en
Session Place
nOS Soutn Main Street
a - • 34010
Valde:; :.. - ..i^'u; - .1
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State Street, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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building
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I I

l
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I

.i

this building

in Salt Lake County w h e r e a temporary

c e r t i f i c a t e of occupancy has been
i *j r A" :, in t lii

Issued durirm the

' 1111 M i l i i -11 P r \; a - ' n effect?

11

L,

No .

'J.

A r e you aware of any other commercial

n " "! ^ ** ")rr
.i .'' U I. A 11

Ii^

building

County where a t e m p o r a r y c e r t i f i c a t e ol
1 i< i | i

l ;_> l, L U i

i n s p e c t i o n s having been
A.

No,

Q»
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1 I i i IJ I
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* e I'M I i 1" e » 1

performed?
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proceaure
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d temporary c e r t i f i c a t e of o c c u p a n c y v a s g I v e n , to a 1 ] ow
'In- u A U h i j L i

ui tin' bn I"disi t o c o n t i n u e to occupy t h e

105

necessary coirspl e t : cr items are

1
2
3

A.
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W o u l d there be any s i t u a t i o n s other l.li.-iri

i m m i n e n t life threatening

s i t u a t i o n s w h i c h would cause

')" i-»11 t" o i sr; \ ;i e a i *i «fit i i"" < '
•
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" I 11

r

."• 11" a t e ?
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1

I relied on in issuing that notice to vacate?

2

I

A.

Well, I didn't do it so I don't really know.

3

Q.

Did you have any input into it?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

None at all?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

You never discussed it with Mr. Eriksson?

8

A.

Yes, I'm sure we discussed it.

9

I don't

remember what we discussed*

10

Q.

So you don't know what they were?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Did you make a recommendation to him on whether

13

or not that notice to vacate should issue?

14

A.

I don't remember.

15

Q.

Did you give an opinion to him in any way with

16

respect to any of the supposed life threatening

17

conditions?

18

A.

I don't recall.

19

Q.

Having reviewed the file, are you aware of any

20

conditions which you would consider life threatening?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Would you consider it an extreme situation to

23

evict someone from a building after issuing a temporary

24

certificate and prior to the final being issued?

25

A.

Would you repeat that?

112

Q.

I believe you testified that in your twenty

some odd years with Salt Lake County you have never been
aware of another situation in which a temporary
certificate was issued and the occupier was then evicted
prior to the issuance of the final, is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

So this building is the only time you've ever

done that?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And the only time you've ever been aware that

it's ever been done?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And the normal procedure is to just allow the

occupier to make whatever repairs are necessary, is that
correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And in order to do that would it be necessary

for the county to tell the occupier what repairs they
required in order for a certificate to issue?
A.

I don't remember the extenuating circumstances

why we refused, but if the same situation was to arise
again I'm sure we'd handle it the same way.

We wouldn't

select one person over another to do that.
MR. WELLS:

Well, that's not the question.

Would you read back the question to him.

E X H I B I T - G

(Examination by Mr. Wells)

A.

I f m not aware of any other cases.

Q.

Other*than the building in which we are

40

presently sitting, are you aware of any cases where a
temporary certificate of occupancy has been issued, and
subsequent to the issuance of that temporary certificate
it has been discovered that there was no building permit
prior to the issuance of that certificate other than for
footings and foundations?
A.

I don't know of any other such case.

Q.

Other than the building at which we are

located at 4252 South .700 East, are you aware of any
case in which a temporary certificate of occupancy has
been issued between the time you came on in 1983 and
January of 1988, being the period when the temporary
certificate was issued, wherein the owners of the
building have been required to vacate the building prior
to the issuance of the final certificate of occupancy?
A.

I ! m noi aware of any other such cases.

Q.

During the period 1983 to the present, are you

aware of any cases where a temporary certificate of
occupancy has been issued and the final certificate of
occupancy has not been issued within the time period set
in the temporary certificate?
A.

I ! m not aware of any.

Q.

Would it be fair to say then that this

NED A. GREENIG - CAPITOL REPORTERS

(Examination by Mr. Wells)
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1

| building at 4252 South 700 East is a one of a kind

2

I situation as far as your experience with the department?

3

1

A.

It is.

4

I

Q.

Did the county revoke the temporary

5

I certificate of occupancy issued on this building in

6

I December of 1985?

7

I

A.

8

1

Q.

That's never been revoked?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Now, you read to us a procedure out of the

No.

11

building code.

Has that procedure been followed with

12

respect to this building?

13

A.

I believe it has.

14

Q.

Tell us in what manner that procedure was

15

followed.

16

A.

The temporary certificate expired after 30

17

days.

There was no certificate of occupancy on this

18

building subsequent to the expiration of the temporary

19

certificate of occupancy and so there was no revocation

20

required.

21

Q.

Do you know when that certificate expired?

22

A.

I don't know the exact date.

23

Q.

Thirty days from issuance?

24

A.

Yes, 30 days from issuance.

Q.

So that would have been sometime in January of

25

I

NED

A.
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I 1986?

2 |
3
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A.

January or February.

I don't remember the

| exact dates,

4

Q.

When did the county discover that there was no

5

building permit on this building other than footings and

6

foundations?

7

A-

8

I think it was discovered —

I don f t have

personal knowledge of that.

9

Q.

Does the county have any documents or records

10

that you 1 re aware of that would indicate when that was

11

discovered?

12

A.

No, not that I'm aware of.

13

Q.

Other than the temporary certificate of

14

occupancy that was issued in December of 1985, to your

15

knowledge, prior to January of 1987 did the county ever

16

issue any other type of certificate of occupancy,

17

temporary or permanent, for this property to any person?

18

A.

Not to my knowledge.

19

Q.

Now, with respect to the requirements for the

20

| issuance of temporary and permanent certificates of

21

| occupancy, I believe you've stated that prior to a

22

| building permit being issued all of the zoning has to be

23

I taken care of and in order, is that correct?

24

I

A.

Usually.

25

I

Q.

Was that the case prior to 1986?

(Examination by Mr. Wells)

1
2
3

I

A.

I'm not sure.

43

Well, it was the case prior to

1986, yes.
Q.

Did you have policies and procedures in place

4

which, to your knowledge, would cause those requirements

5

to be verified prior to the issuance of a certificate of

6

occupancy?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Would you tell me what those policies and

9
10

procedures were?
A.

Again they were for the most part oral.

But

11

they did involve the review of the file by the

12

dispatcher to see to it that -- let me back up a

13

little.

14

the building, the dispatcher or the dispatch clerk also

15

sends out a request to the fire department, to flood

16

control and to zoning to get their approval to make sure

17

that all of their requirements have been met.

18

dispatch clerk then will receive those back a day or two

19

or few days later.

20

approvals are in the file including the final inspection

21

approval, building inspection approval, at that time the

22

dispatch clerk determines then that the file is complete

23

and it's appropriate to issue a certificate of

24

occupancy.

25

Q.

At the time a final inspection is requested for

The

And once all of those documents and

What, if any, of those procedures would be

NED

A .
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1

| taken prior to the issuance of a temporary certificate

2

I of occupancy?

3

I

4
5

A.

Probably none of them.

Q.

What does the code require prior to issuance

of a temporary certificate of occupancy?

6

A.

May I read again from the code?

7

Q.

You may.

8

A.

307, Paragraph D: If the building official

9

finds that no substantial hazard will result from

10

occupancy of any building or portion thereof before the

11

same is completed, he may issue a temporary certificate

12

of occupancy for the use of a portion or portions of a

13

building or structure prior to the completion of the

14

entire building or structure.

15

Q.

To your knowledge, would any check be made

16

prior to issuance of a temporary certificate of

17

occupancy to determine that in fact a building permit

18

| had been issued?

19

A.

Ordinarily only to determine if there is a

20

J building permit number assigned.

21

|

Q.

Would they check that number to see what it -

22

I

A.

Not necessarily.

23

I

Q.

So it would be possible for a contractor to

24

I just write a number in and say that's my number and no

25

| check would be made and a certificate would be issued,

(Examination by Mr. Wells)
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1

| is that correct?

2

I

3

I in our office.

4

| inspection unless we had first at least looked to see if

5

I there was a file at that address and to take the number

6

I off the file.

7

I before he leaves the office.

A.

No.

There would have to be some documentation
We wouldn't even go out on the

So the inspector has the permit number
He does ask others for

8

that number.

9

Q,

So he gets the number from the office files?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And would it be his responsibility then to

12

determine that there was a permit prior to going out on

13

an inspection?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Were there policies and procedures in place

16

that were designed to require the inspector to check the

17

permit prior to going on an inspection?

IS
19

A.

Each of the inspectors are instructed to check

the file before they go out, yes.

20

Q.

Now, what are they instructed to check for?

21

A.

They're instructed to check to see if the file

22

is complete, and what the most recent inspection was,

23

and if there is follow-up work required.

24
25

Q.

Now, what types of inspections would be made

J by the county on a building which had only a footings

NED

A.
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1

| and foundations permit?

2

I

A.

What kind would be made or should be made?

3

I

Q.

Should and would.

4

| difference there is.

5

I under the code?

6

I

A.

Under the footing and foundation permit?

7

|

Q.

Let f s assume that a contractor has a footings

8

I and foundations only permit.

9
10

Well, I don f t know what the

What inspections are required

What inspections under the

code would be required?
A.

We would perform an inspection prior to

11

pouring the footings themselves when the footings are

12

ready to receive the concrete.

13

inspection of the foundation walls above the footing

14

when they were ready to receive the concrete.

15

would perform inspections of any sub-rough plumbing,

16

utilities that go underneath the basement floor or the

17

ground floor prior to pouring the concrete for that

18
19
20
21

We would perform an

And we

i floor.
Q.

What additional inspections are performed

after the permit for the rest of the building is given?
A.

There would be many on a building like this.

22

There would be framing inspections.

23

beam inspections for the masonry walls.

24

electrical, mechanical, plumbing inspections, both rough

25

and final and probably multiple of those.

NED

A.
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1

| buildings get larger, we have to come back several times

2

I usually.

3

|

Q.

What's a four-way final inspection?

4

I

A.

A four-way final inspection is where building

5

| requirements, mechanical, electrical, and plumbing

6

I requirements are all checked prior to issuance of a

7

I certificate of occupancy.

8

Q.

9

Now, would that normally be done prior to the

issuance of a temporary certificate of occupancy?

0

A.

Yes.

1

Q.

Now, you've testified that the inspector has

2

the obligation to verify the permit and the number

3

before he goes out on an inspection, is that correct?

4

A.

That's part of his job.

5

Q.

Now, I want you to assume that you have a

6

building where the only permit that's ever been issued

7

is footings and foundations, and you have an inspector

.8

I that's called on to come out and conduct a four-way

.9

final inspection.

0

factors, what should happen?

1

A.

2

Can you tell me, given those two

He should look at the file, make sure that the

permit is complete, and if it isn't he should notify the

3

I contractor that he's in violation.

4

I

5

I procedures in place in the department which required the

Q.

To your knowledge, were there policies and

(Examination by Mr. Wells)
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1

| inspectors to verify the existence of the building

2

I permit prior to making any inspection?

3

|

A.

There were oral policies and procedures, yes.

4

|

Q.

Were the inspectors trained in that respect?

5

I

A.

Yes.

6

I

Q,

How did they receive that training?

7

I

A.

In staff meetings, staff training meetings.

Q.

So it would be a violation of the duties of

8
9

that inspector if he went out and made an inspection on

10

a building and there was not extant a valid building

11

permit?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Do you know whether or not a four-way final

14

inspection was performed on this building prior to the

15

issuance of the temporary certificate of occupancy?

16

A.

I believe that it was.

17

Q.

And you've testified there was no building

18

permit which allowed the consrruction to proceed that.

19

far?

20

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Was it then a violation of the duties of the

21

I

22

| inspector to have made that inspection?

23

|

A.

I would say yes.

24

I

Q.

Were there any policies and procedures in

25

| place as a back-up to prevent that type of a mistake
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from occurring?
A.

No.

Q.

Had you ever issued in the period from 1983 to

1986, did you ever issue any temporary certificates of
occupancy?
A.

Not me personally, that I recall.

Q.

Were you ever given any training in how to do

A.

Just discussions between myself and Ray Noble.

Q.

Tell me what he told you you should do in that

that?

respect.
A.

We discussed it mutually to try and outline

what ought to be done, and basically it was to look to
make sure that there are no obvious life safety
violations, and that at least we are not aware of any
substantial problems with the building.
Q.

Approximately how much time would be involved

in verifying from the records in your office wherher or
not a building permit had been issued?
A.

Just a few minutes.

Q.

By a few, five, ten, twenty?

A.

Five minutes.

Q.

When you had these discussions with Mr. Noble

about the issuance of temporary certificates of
occupancy, were discussions had with respect to

NFD
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verification of the existence of, for example, zoning
clearance, building permits?
A.

No. We are concerned only with life safety.

Q.

Would it be fair to say you didn't care

whether they had a building permit at that point?
A.

No. We cared but we felt that it was -- if

such a condition existed, it would have been discovered
prior to that.
Q.

So you just assumed you would know?

A. Yes.
Q.

Were you aware of any procedures other than

that the inspector should have checked that would cause
the absence of a building permit to be discovered prior
to issuance of a temporary certificate of occupancy?
A.
Q.

No.
Do you know how many inspections were

performed on this building by county inspectors
subsequenr to footings and foundations?
A.

I don f t know how many.

I know there was a

number of inspections performed after that.
Q.

Would it be fair to say that on each of those

inspections the inspector violated his duty and
responsibility by making the inspection in the absence
of a building permit?
A. Yes.
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|

2

I told they should do with respect to verifying permits

3

| prior to going out on an inspection?

4

|

5

I look at your file before you go out.

6

| complete.

7

t received on a regular basis.

8

I

9
10

Q.

51

A.

Q.

To your knowledge, what were the inspectors

I remember many times saying to the inspectors
Make sure it's

That's the kind of instruction that they

Now, were they given an explanation of what a

complete file ought to contain?
A.

Yes.

Specifically we mentioned make sure that

11

it's not just a footing and foundation permit.

12

a full permit.

13

Q.

Look for

Do you recall whether that training and those

14

instructions were given to the inspectors prior to

15

December of 1985?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

was it your understanding that those

18

instructions were in place from the time you were

19

employed onward?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Now, just as a point of clarification, as I

22

understand it, your department's major written, I guess

23

we should say, procedures or whatever were to follow the

24

code?

25

A.

Yes.

NTTD
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And if the code said something should be done,

your instructions to the people in the department were
that's the way it should be done?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And the building code does require a permit

prior to construction?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And your understanding is that it would be a

violation of the code to construct a building such as
the one we're in with a footings and foundations only
permit?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And that is a situation which should have

been discovered by your inspectors on each and every
inspection other than a footings and foundations
inspection?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And particularly on a final four-way?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Would it be fair to state that your

understanding of the code is that a temporary
certificate of occupancy should not be issued absent a
building permit?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And if it were so issued, it would be subject

(Examination by Mr. Wells)
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to being revoked pursuant to the code?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And if it were so issued, it would be an

error?
A.

Yes.

Q.

It would be unauthorized by law?
MR. THURGOOD:

I object.

I think you're

asking for a legal conclusion.
THE WITNESS:
Q.

I don't think I can answer that,

It would be a violation of the code, as you

understand it?
A.
code.

The building official hasn't violated the
He has issued a certificate in error and the

certificate would have no validity.

But the actual

procedure of issuing the temporary certificate in error
is not in itself a violation of the code.
Q.

It's not a violation of the code as such?

A.

That's right:.

Q.

It's merely a violation of the tenets of the

A.

It's a violation of procedures.

code?
It's a

violation by the builder to have built without the
permit, but the most that can be said for the
certificate itself is simply that it's invalid.
Q.

And if the builder were to ask you to issue

T0"rn
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1

| such a certificate, he'd be asking basically for an

2

I invalid certificate?

3

A,

That's correct.

Q.

And the builder certainly should know whether

4

I

5

| he had a permit or not?

6

I

7

I building department frequently makes.

8 |
9

A,

Q.

Yes.

That's another assumption that the

Does the county make efforts to safeguard the

1 files that it maintains?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

So it's possible that something might be lost?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

But if something were lost, you would not know

14

Not always successful but, yes.

what it was obviously?

15

A.

That's correct.

16

Q.

Now, you've indicated that you keep a card or

17
18

something of that nature on each building?
I

19

A.

We keep a file.

Q.

And tell me what a typical file would normally

20

I contain.

21

I

22

| folder.

23

I would have copies of all inspections, inspection report

24

| forms for inspections that had been performed on that

25

I buildina.

A.

The file would contain —

it's in a manila

It would have inside the building permit.

It would have copies of all inspection
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1

| requests that have come in by telephone filled out on a

2

| little card or paper.

3

I fire, flood or zoning approvals that may have come

4

I through or requests for such that may have gone out.

5

I may also contain letters, correspondence related to that

6

I file, memorandums occasionally.

7

And it would also contain any

Those are relatively

rare.

8

Q.

9

Would it be fair to say then that anything

relating to that property would go in that file?

10
11

A.

As far as the building permit is concerned,

Q.

Now, do you with respect to that file have

yes.

12
13

anything similar to a docket card which would list the

14

items that should be in the file that have been

15

received?

16
17

It

A.

We didn't at that time.

There was a little

I stamp that we put on the front that just was fire,

18

flood and zoning where it could be checked off at that

19

time.

20

We've modified that procedure since.
Q.

Was there anything checked on there that would

21

show the date the permit was issued, anything of that

22

nature?

23

A.

On the outside of the file?

24

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes, on the label.

25

I

NED
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1

gives the address of the property, the building permit

2

number, the date that it was issued, and the name of the

3

applicant, and sometimes the description, brief

4

description of the work.

5

Q.

And that would be the label for the file?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Now, when you say it gives the number, I

8

believe you previously testified that the procedure

9

would be if a footing and foundation only was issued,

10

that that would get a number, and then at the point in

11

time where the full permit was issued it would get a new

12

number?

13

A.

At that time, yes.

14

Q.

Would that then be on a label and go on the

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And so the procedure would be that upon

15

file?

18

issuance of the full permit a new label would be made

19

and put on the file?

20

A.

Usually an additional label.

21

Q.

So the original would be there and then the

22

second one would be there?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

So it would be relatively easy for someone

25

checkina the file to determine whether or not a full

(Examination by Mr. Wells)
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1

| permit had been issued?

2

|

3

| hidden by the folder coming up to it so you only saw the

4

I top one.

5 |
6

A.

Q.

Yes, except the second label was usually

But it's just a matter of looking and then you

I can see that number?

7

A.

Yes,

8

Q.

Did the first label denote that it was

9

footings and foundations only?

10

A.

I'm not sure.

11

Q.

Do you know in this case whether it did?

12

A.

I'm not sure.

13

Q.

While you're checking these records, could you

14

Ordinarily it would.

check that for us and determine?

15

A.

I have every reason to believe that it did.

16

Q.

All right.

17

That's something I would like you

to verify for me, if you could.

18

MS. MARLOWE:

Can you?

19

THE WITNESS:

I will check the records.

20

MS. MARLOWE:

Can you find it?

21

THE WITNESS:

I think I can.

22

MS. MARLOWE:

Well, assuming they're there.

23

Q.

So that I understand, the normal practice

24

would be to put footings and foundations only and then

25

aive it a number?
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1

I

A.

That's correct.

2

I

Q.

Would it be fair to say that that was the

3

I procedure?

4

I

5 |

A.

Yes.

Q.

And, to your knowledge, that procedure was

6

| followed in this case?

7

I

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

As far as you know?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Do you have any reason to believe that

11

procedures with respect to labeling the file and giving

12

numbers were not followed in this case?

13

A.

14
15

No.
MS. MARLOWE:

Could we take a break for a

minute.

16

MR. WELLS:

Sure.

17

(Short recess.)

18

Q.

Tell me how inspections are generated.

19

A.

The builder proceeds with his work until he is

20

ready to cover that particular aspect of the work.

He

21

then calls in to our office and requests the inspection

22

and gives the address, the permit number, and the kind

23

of inspection and the date that he ! d like to have that

24

inspection, usually the next day.

25

pulled and put in the inspector's tub, if you will, and

Then the file is
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1

he comes in the next morning and finds his list or his

2

group of inspections to be done that day.
Q.

3
4

Now, you indicated something about a little

card being made out.

Is that something that --

A.

A little slip of paper, an inspection request

7

Q.

Yes.

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Now, is that a form that would stay in the

11

A.

Ordinarily, yes.

12

Q.

So I guess whoever answers the phone would

5
6

10

13

form?

file?

fill out that little slip?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Then go pull the file, attach the slip to the

16

file and put it in the inspector's box, is that correct?

17

A.

That's correct.

18

Q.

So the inspector then prior to going out on

19

the inspection would have the file?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And at that time, having the file in his

22

hands, how much of an effort would it be to verify that

23

a permit in fact was issued?

24

A.

Not very difficult.

25

Q.

In fact, he could check the number right there
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on the file?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And, to your knowledge, were the inspectors

trained to in fact verify the number on the slip with
the number on the file?
A*

Yes.

They had received that instruction

repeatedly.
Q.

And so it would be a violation of their

instructions and duties if they did not make that check?
A.

Yes.

Q.

I want you to assume that just a footings and

foundations permit had been issued on a particular job,
and that the policy of the office had been followed, and
that the label on the file showed footings and
foundations only number whatever.

And that an inspector

received -- let's say he received a call to come out and
inspect masonry work.

And on the little slip that he

got ihere was a number and he locked at the number,
looked at the file and saw footings and foundations only
number 12345, and on the inspection request the permit
number was 12345, at that point in time what duties and
obligations would the inspector have with respect to the
policies and procedures he should follow?
A.

His duty at that point probably would be to go

to the job site and notify the contractor that he was in
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violation, that the inspection would not be performed
until he had corrected his paperwork problems,
permitting problems.
Q.

When you say probably, explain what you mean

by that.
A.

Well, another alternative would be to simply

call the builder on the telephone and talk to him on the
phone.
Q.

Ordinarily he would probably go to the job site.
So what you're telling me is that his

obligation would be to contact the builder and make sure
that the permitting problem were resolved?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And the problem relates to how he does that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But that would be his obligation, his duty,

what he's trained to do?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And were he to fail to do that, would that be

a violation of his duties and obligations?
A.

Yes.

It would result probably in a lower

valuation if we discovered it.
Q.

Would it be a violation of his duties to come

out and perform the inspection without saying anything
to the contractor about the permitting problem?
A.

Yes.
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Would it be a violation of his duties not to

discover the permitting problem?
A.

Probably.

He'd have to at least look, and

there may be cases in some files where it's not so
obvious.

For instance, there may have been other papers

stapled over the building permit.

He didn't go through

all the papers and get down and discover that it was
footings and foundations.

He's obligated to at least

open the file and take a few seconds or minute or so to
check the file and see that it is current and
up-to-date.
miss it.

There's still a possibility that he would

And his first obligation is to look at the

file and see that it's complete.

If he misses it after

having made a cursory review, that's not necessarily a
violation.
Q.

Were the files constructed in such a manner as

to cover up the label?
A.

Only the way I described it to you with the

folder closed.

But once they open the folder they don't

usually look at the label.

They only look at the label

when the folder is closed, then they open it up to look
at the contents.
Q.

How would they verify that the number on the

little slip was the same number as the file?
A.

That's really not part of their
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1

| responsibility.

2

|

Q,

Whose responsibility is that?

3

|

A.

That's the dispatch clerk.

4

|

Q.

Has the dispatch clerk been trained to make

5

I that verification?

6

I

A.

Yes.

7

I

Q.

And has the dispatch clerk been trained to

8

I know the difference between a full permit and a footings

9

and foundations only permit?

10

A.

They would know the difference, yes.

11

Q.

And should they receive a request for an

12

inspection other than footings and foundations, using a

13

footings and foundations only number, were they trained

14

to bring that to someone's attention?

15

A.

That was not part of their duty.

Only if they

16

became aware of the problem, but it was not -- because

17

the files are usually pulled sometime after the

18

inspection request is received, all they're looking for

19

is to verify the address and the permit number.

20

not looking at the type of inspection or the type of

21

permit or anything like that.
Q.

They're

22

I

23

I that the inspection was being made on a validly issued

24

I permit?

25

I

A.

Whose duty and obligation was it to determine

The contractor.
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1

|

Q.

The county had no such duty?

2

I

A.

Only as a courtesy.

3

|

Q.

So you would come out and make an inspection

4

I even if they didn't have a permit as long as they gave

5

| you some kind of a number?

6

I

7

I could find a file in our files.

8

I

9
10
11

A.

Q.

As long as they gave us a number for which we

And even if the number were for the wrong

kind of a permit, your people had no duty to make that
verification?
A.

They had a duty only insofar as their

12

performance evaluations might be affected by their

13

continuing failure to pick up on that kind of a

14

problem.

15

call in a valid permit number and request appropriate

16

inspections.

17

Q.

The first duty lies with the contractor to

I understand that.

But if the contractor was

18

determined that he was going to build the building

19

without a permit, are you telling me that your

20

department had no policies or procedures in place that

21

would prevent that from happening?

22

A.

The policies and procedures that we have would

23

prevent final occupancy of that building from being

24

allowed.

25

Q.

But they wouldn't prevent a temporary

(Examination by Mr. Wells)
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I certificate?
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I

3

I problem we act on it.

4

A.

Q.
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It's set up so that if we discover that

I understand that.

What I want to know is

5

what policies and procedures were in place that would

6

cause you to make that discovery?

7

A.

Only the instruction that they should look at

8

the file, and if they discover that it's not correct,

9

that they should not make the inspection.

10

Q.

And I think that's back to where we got

11

started before you gave me the probably.

12

telling me then that the inspector has the duty and

13

obligation to determine that there's a permit?

14
15
16
17

A.

He has the duty and obligation to determine

—

to review the file for completeness.
Q.

And that would include determining whether

there's a permit?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

All right.

20

Are you

And so if he doesn't make that

determination, then it's a violation of his duty?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Now, let's talk about a document called a stop

23

work order.

24

A.

25

Tell me what those are and who issues them.

Stop work order is an order specified in the

I building code that allows the building official or his
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1

| authorized representative to notify a contractor that he

2

I is to stop work on the structure for some violation of

3

| the building code.

4

|

Q.

And who issues those?

5

|

A.

The building official or his authorized

6

| representative.

7 |

Q.

And once a stop work order is issued, what

8

| policies and procedures did your department have in 1983

9

I to 1986 to enforce the stop work order?

10
11
12
13
14

A.

In other words, to make sure that the builder

does not continue to work?
Q.

Yes.

continue to —
A.

And continue to get inspections and
those kinds of things.

First of all, the stop work order —

a stop

15

work order would be stamped or written on the front of

16

the file usually in large letters.

17

Q.

So anybody could see it?

18

A.

Yes, as soon as they picked up the file.

19

Q.

That's what should happen?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

If it did not happen, would that be a

22

violation of procedures?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

All right.

25

A.

As far as the builder himself continuing work,

Go ahead.
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1

| we don't usually use any kind of force unless there is

2

| an apparent life safety violation at which time we would

3

I probably bring in a sheriff to obtain compliance with

4

| that work order if he didn't voluntarily stop upon our

5

I notice.

6

I

Q.

Now, when you say a life safety --

7

I

A.

In other words, if they are creating a hazard

8

by the structure that they're building that may present

9

danger to the life of the public, for instance, walking

10

by on the sidewalk, construction is going to fall on

11

them, then we have to take some summary kind of action.

12

But ordinarily we give them the notice, and if they don't

13

voluntarily comply we ordinarily go through some kind of

14

a legal procedure, take them to court or something,

15

rather than summary action.

16

Q.

What steps are normally taken by your office

17

or what procedures are in place for the determination of

18

whether or nor the order is being complied with?

19
20
21

A.

Usually just on-site visits or observations by

the field inspector.
Q.

Do you know whether at any time a stop work

22

order was issued with respect to the building at 4252

23

South 700 East?

24

A.

I'm not sure.

25

Q.

Does your department maintain records of those
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1

| orders?

2

|

3

| Yes, there would be a record of it in that file for this

4

I building.

5 |

A.

Q.

It would be in conjunction with that file.

But you don't know whether one was ever issued

6

I on this building or enforced or --

7

|

8

| that stamp on the front of the file but I'm not sure.

9

1

A.

Q.

I'm not sure.

I seem to recall having seen

That's an area where we need some testimony.

10

I don't know whether we're going to need to continue him

11

or whether we can get it from Ray when he comes.

12

A.

13

information.

14

Ray should be able to provide that

MR. WELLS:

I will not insist then that this

15

deposition be continued to produce that information on

16

your representation that Mr. Noble will provide it.

17
18

MS. MARLOWE:
Q.

On his representation.

On your representation, and if Mr. Noble does

19

not, then we will have to continue this deposition.

20

that understood?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

That's agreeable?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

All right.

25

Is

Let's assume that a stop work

order has been issued and there is such a stamo on the
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Would it be a violation of the

procedures and policies of your office for an inspector
to go out and make a subsequent inspection on the work
on a building prior to the lifting of that stop work
order?
A.

Yes, except to determine compliance with the

stop work order, of course.
Q.

I understand.

But if, for example, they

received an electrical inspection or a plumbing
inspection or

—

A.

They couldn't give any approvals on such work.

Q.

All right.

And if they did, that would be a

violation of procedures?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Would it be a violation of procedures for them

to make inspections for subcontractors while that stop
work order was in effect?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That would include mechanical, electrical,

plumbing, any type of work at all?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Tell us with respect to the stop work order,

does that stop every type of work of any type on the
premises?
A.

Ordinarilv it does unless it specifically is
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1

| restricted to one area*

2

| discretion of the building official, he may say the

3

| electrical work is stopped on this because you're not

4

I complying.

5

I something like that.

6
7
8

For instance, sometimes at the

You can go ahead with the plumbing or
That's a rare occurrence but it

does occasionally happen.
Q.

But if it were other than a total stop work,

that would be so noted?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And if there were no such notation, then the

11

stop work order would be for the complete project?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

And any work carried on prior to the lifting

14

of that stop work order would be a violation of the

15

provisions of the building code?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Would it be a violation of the provisions of a

18

I building code to do work on the building without a

19

permit?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Any type of work?

22

A.

No.

There's some work that could be permitted

23

on the property.

Putting up a fence, paving the ground,

24

putting in a utility, for instance, the power or

25

something like that.
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Q.

What about painting?

A.

Painting is generally not regulated by the

Q.

So types of work that may not be regulated

code.

you're saying could go on without a permit even though
the building itself had been built in violation of not
having a permit?
A.

That's a very difficult question.

Q.

What I'm trying to get at is if it's a

violation of the code to put the wall up, is it also a
violation to paint the wall?
A.

I would say it probably would be.

question I haven't been asked.

That's a

I really hadn't thought

about that before, but I think it probably would be a
violation, the intent being that before they continue
any further with the work we have to find out if what
they're doing is legal.

Maybe they'll have to tear it

down, and we don't want them putting more on that
they'll have to tear down.
Q.

So if they had footings and foundations only,

any work on the rest of the building would be in
violation?
A,

Yes.

Q.

Now, is it your understanding that the county

has adopted an ordinance incorporating- the 1982 buildina

(Examination by Mr. Wells)

1

I code?

2

I

3 |

A.
Q.

Yes.
Is the 1982 code the code that was in place

4

| during 1984 and 1985?

5

|

6 |

72

A*

Yes.

Q*

To your knowledge, does the county ordinance

7

I make it a crime to violate the building code?

8

I

9
10

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you have anything to do with the temporary

occupancy certificate that was issued on this building?

11

A.

I did not.

12

Q.

As far as you know, this particular building,

13

4252 South 700 East, is the only instance that you're

14

aware of in the history of Salt Lake County where a

15

temporary certificate of occupancy has been issued

16

without there previously having been a valid building

17

permit?

18

I

19
20

A.

For the entire building, that's correct.

Q.

Do you know what inspections were performed on

the building by the county, this building?

21

A.

22

I don't have a personal knowledge of it.

the records that are available to me.

Just

We perform about

23

I ten to 20,000 inspections a year.

24

I

25

| aware of the fact that inspections other than footings

Q.

I understand.

I!m just wondering if you were
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and foundations had been carried out on this building by
county inspectors?
A.

I am aware of that fact, yes.

Q.

Do you know how many of those there were?

A.

No.

Q.

As to the performance of each of those

I would say probably a dozen.

inspections, there was no building permit allowing the
work that was being inspected?
A.

That's apparently correct, yes.

Q.

At least to the knowledge you have, that's

correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

At least as a representative of the county,

you 1 re admitting that there was no building permit?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that those inspections were performed at

a time when there was no building permit other than
footings and foundations?
A.

Any inspections performed after the footings

and foundations, and I believe there were several, were
done without the proper permits.
Q.

All right.

And assuming that there was in

existence a stop work order at the time any of those
inspections were performed, would it also be a violation
to have performed those inspections given a stop work
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74

1

I order?

2

I

A*

Yes.

3

|

Q.

Would it also be a violation of the code?

4

I

A.

No.

Q.

Is it a violation of the code to perform the

5
6

A violation of procedures.

inspections without the existence of a building permit?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

But it is a violation of procedures?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Is it a violation of procedure to issue —

or

11

was it a violation of procedure to issue a temporary

12

certificate of occupancy without there being a valid

13

building permit for other than footings and foundations?

14
15
16
17
18

A.

I think it probably would have to be

considered a violation of procedure.
Q.

Do the employees of your department have

discretion to ignore the procedures of the department?
A.

There is some discretion allowed, but it would

19

have to be very exceptional circumstances.

The

20

procedures are not intended to address every possible

21

circumstance that might arise, and if there is a

22

circumstance where applying our usual procedures would

23

not achieve the intent of the code, that is, protection

24

of life safety and public health and welfare and so on,

25

there is a certain amount of discretion on the part of
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the inspector to deviate from procedures.
Q,

Does the inspector have discretion to waive

code requirements?
A.

No.

Q.

And when I say inspector, I mean any employee

of your department up to and including yourself or Mr.
Noble.
A.

I understand that.

Q.

And maybe I should just use employees.

Would

employees of your department have discretion to waive
the existence of a building permit in performing an
inspection?
A.

No.

Q.

Would employees of your department have

discretion to waive the existence of a building permit
in issuing a temporary certificate of occupancy?
A.

No.

Q.

Would employees of your department have

discretion to waive a stop work order and allow
construction to proceed?
A.

Not without having satisfied themselves that

the conditions of the stop work order had been met.
They may be able to lift it themselves.
Q.

I understand that.

But without actually

lifting it, and let's assume that the stop work order
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1

| remains in effect, do employees have discretion to allow

2

| work to continue while that stop work order is in

3

I effect?

4

A.

5

allow that.

I can't think of a circumstance that would

6

I

7

| of the department have discretion to go ahead and

8

| inspect and approve work while a stop work order was in

9

I effect?

10

A.

11

Q.

Would your employees -- or would the employees

Ordinarily, no.

I can't think of

circumstances that would allow that.

12

Q.

Would it be fair to say, then, that these

13

requirements such as not allowing work to proceed while

14

there's a stop work order, not allowing work to proceed

15

without a building permit, are mandatory requirements

16

that cannot be waived at the discretion of the employee?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And so there would be nothing discretionary

19

about that?

20
21
22

I

A.

No.

Q.

It wouldn't call on someone to interpret a

procedure?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

In 1986, I believe you said it was January, is

25

I when the department was reorganized?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

And at that time the present organizational

3

I structure came into effect?

4

I

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Which makes you Ray Noble's supervisor?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

I believe you testified earlier that Mr. Noble

8

had discretion to run his department, is that correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

To what extent since January of 1986 have you

11

supervised, if at all, the day-to-day activities of, and

12

I forget what we call it now that it's changed to the

13

department?

14

A.

Inspection services.

15

Q.

Inspection services, is that the department

16

that Ray Noble is head of?

17
18

I

A.

No.

He's building inspection.

Q.

And I understand that's a subdivision of your

19

department?

20

A.

Of my section, yes.

21

Q.

I want you to tell us the extent of

22

supervision that you give to Mr. Noble in running his

23

department or whatever it's denominated.

24
25

A.

I supervise him fairly closely, requiring him

to ar least show how he is accomplishing certain
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1

objectives, not necessarily telling him how to do it.

2

Sometimes telling him how to do it.

3

Q.

With respect to the day-to-day operation of

4

his department, does he have discretion to run that

5

pretty much the way he wants?

6

A.

Answerable to me, yes.

7

Q.

With respect to decisions to issue or not

8

issue building permits, to issue or not issue

9

certificates of occupancy, stop work orders, temporary

10

certificates of occupancy, to what extent, if any, would

11

you be involved in those decisions?

12

A.

I don't interfere with him.

I make many of

13

those decisions in his absence since he's in the field

14

most of the time.

15

whether or not a permit should be issued or whether or

16

nor an inspection should be performed, he has the final

17

say in that.

18

Q.

But if there's any question about

I don't interfere with him in that.

Did there come a rime when you became aware

19

that there were problems with this property at 4252

20

South 700 East?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

When did that occur?

23

A.

It was a short time subsequent to the issuance

24

of the temporary certificate of occupancy, probably a

25

couple of months later.
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1

|

Q.

Who brought the problem to your attention?

2

1

A.

I don't recall.

Q.

Do you recall what was said at that occasion?

3 |

I believe it was Ray Noble.

4

1

A.

I don't.

5

|

Q.

Did whoever talk to you tell you what the

6

| problems were?

7

1

8
9

A.

I don't recall.

Q.

What did you perceive at that point the

problem to be?

10

A.

As I recall —

and let me preface this.

I get

11

many problem situations that come up, and until they

12

have evolved to a certain point, I don't really keep

13

track of it in my mind too well until it reaches a point

14

where it becomes a major issue.

15

minor problems that come up, and this one I think I

16

probably regarded that way until it started to unfold.

17

Q.

18

There are a lot of

At what point in time did you perceive the

problem with rhis property to be a major problem?

19

A.

Probably in late summer subsequent to the

20

temporary certificate of occupancy.

21

been I guess about August of 1986, if my dates are

22

correct.

23

J

Q.

24

| perceive the problem to be?

25

|

A.

That would have

And at that point in time what did you

A building being illegally occupied without
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proper permits or certificates of occupancy.
Q.

Now, when you say being illegally occupied --

A.

Occupied without a valid certificate of

occupancy and having a number of problems that needed to
be rectified before such certificate of occupancy could
be issued.
Q.

Were you aware at that time that no building

permit other than footings and foundations had been
issued?
A.

I believe I was aware of it at that time.

Q.

Were you aware at that time that a stop work

order had been issued?
A.

I don't recall whether or not one had ever

been issued.
Q.

I don't have a clear recollection of that.

You were aware -- well, why don't you tell me,

to the best of your recollection, those things that you
were aware of with respect to the property at that point
in rime.
A.

I think that what really brought it to my

attention as a significant problem was the submittal to
the county of a report on this building prepared by some
design professionals, an architect and some engineers
who had reviewed the building and determined that there
were numerous structural and other code problems with
it.

At that point in time I felt this was an out of the

NPfl

A

rZPFTKTTn

-

PADTTnT

DT?DnDmrDC

(Examination by Mr. Wells)

81

1

| ordinary problem, and I started to put things into the

2

I memory banks, still not entirely clear with exactly the

3

| order or the dates involved.

4

| August or so of 1986 that we received those reports.

5

|

6

| sometime, July, August?

7

I

8

I fall.

9

Q.

Now, you have indicated that this was summer

A.

Late summer.

Maybe even as far into as early

Maybe as far as September, in other words.
Q.

10

It must have been around

Were you aware that prior to that time Mr.

Noble had been having problems with the property?

11

A.

I'm sure I was aware that there were some

12

problems with it, but it wasn't significant enough for

13

me to get closely involved with it.

14

Q.

15

So whatever Mr. Noble may have done prior to

July or August of September, you were not aware of?

16

A.

17

I was not involved with it enough to even form

a memory on it.

18

Q.

With respect to decisions such as requiring a

19

party to vacate a building, are those the types of

20

decisions that normally would be made by Mr. Noble alone

21

or would he consult you on those?

22

A.

He would normally do that alone.

23

for my opinion on it.

24

occurrence so we don't have a

25

J

Q.

He may ask

I say normally, it's a very rare
—

Was there a policy or procedure in place with
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1

| respect to who ought to make that decision and under

2

| what circumstances?

3

|

4

I the decision should be made by the building official.

5

| The circumstances would —

6

| outlined specifically for that, no, other than what ! s in

7

| the building code.

8

|

9

I County ever evicting an occupant from a building?

10
11
12

A.

Q.

A.

I don't think there was ever a question that

there had never been criteria

Prior to 1986 are you aware of Salt Lake

I'm not aware of any such circumstances having

occurred before.
Q.

Even up to the present time, are you aware of

13

any other situation where Salt Lake County has ever

14

evicted an occupier of a building after having issued a

15

temporary certificate and prior to the final being

16

issued?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

To your knowledge, were there ever any

19

policies or procedures or discussions, oral procedures,

20

anything, with respect to the criteria that would be

21

relied upon in causing someone to be evicted from a

22

building?

23

A.

Yes.

If I can take just a minute to kind of

24

explain that.

There are oral policies in place that

25

indicate that we don't take any kind of summary action,
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1

| as I mentioned before, unless there is real danger of

2

I life, health or property that would result from our

3

| failure to vacate a building or io carry out some kind

4

| of summary action.

5

| find, for instance, that someone is building over a stop

6

| work order or building without a permit or occupying

7

I without a certificate of occupancy, all which are

8

| violations of the building code, we will typically not

9

J take summary action to take that person to court or to

10

vacate or anything like that unless we feel that there

11

is a real serious life safety problem.

12

building code, as we understand it, we actually would

13

have the authority as soon as we discover that situation

14

to immediately go out and vacate a building, but we have

15

just made it a policy or a procedure, an oral procedure,

16

We will typically, even when we

Under the

J if you will, that we won't do that unless it just gets

17

so serious and so dangerous that there needs to be some

IS

more summary aciion raken.

19
20

Q.

So it would be an extreme situation to cause

someone to vacate?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And when you say the situation gets extreme,

23

that would mean that there was imminent danger to life

24

or limb?

25

A.

There is evidence that there is imminent
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1

| danger to life or limb.

2

|

3

| wouldn't let them back in I guess until that danger had

4

I been resolved?

5

I

A.

That's correct.

6

I

Q.

Would it be the normal practice to allow the

7

I building occupier to make the repairs while they were

8

I still occupying the building assuming there was not some

9

Q.

And so then you would cause them to vacate and

imminent life threatening danger?

10

A.

Yes.

Understand that the occupant of the

11

building would need to follow appropriate state laws,

12

getting permits and getting licensed contractors and so

13

on where it's appropriate.

14

Q.

15
16

But assuming that efforts were

being made to cause those things to be done, you would
I not normally just kick them out until it was done?

17
18

I understand.

i

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And i*c would rake some Type of an evenz to

19

cause them to actually vacate?

In other words, you have

20

to discover something that's life threatening or --

21

A.

Yes, that's correct.

22

Q.

And would it be fair to say that -- let's

23

I assume a situation where like we had here where you've

24

| got somebody occupying a building, the temporary

25

| certificate has expired, and a determination has been

NFD
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made that certain items have to be completed before a
permanent certificate will be issued.

And let's assume

that on the list of items to be completed there is
nothing that relates to a life threatening type of a
situation.

As I understand it, your procedure would be

to allow them to remain in the building and complete
those items and then the final certificate would be
issued?
A.

That would ordinarily be the procedure that

we'd follow.
Q.

And let's assume that that procedure were

being followed.

Would it be fair to say then that no

notice to vacate then would issue under the standard
procedure unless it were discovered in the interim that
there was some life threatening, imminent life
threatening, situation in the building?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Would rhe county normally come OUT: and make

the inspections on the building to determine what needed
to be done to comply with the code?
A.

It depends on the particular situation.

In

this case we wouldn't have come out to make further
inspections until the proper permits and approvals were
in place.
Q.

And so, if I understand it correctly, at least
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carry out those responsibilities?
A.

I became the building official with regard to

this building.

4

Q.

And have been since that date?

5

A.

No.

When he was subsequently —

I understand

6

that he was released or that he is no longer personally

7

being sued, and at that point in time when his personal

8

involvement ended he resumed his involvement as building

9

official on this building.

10
11

(Exhibit 4 was marked.)
Q.

I'm handing you what's been marked as Exhibit

12

4 which purports to be page 1 of Exhibit 2 without the

13

return receipt showing thereon.

14

as having been part of that document?

Do you recognize that

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Without the return receipt showing?

17

A.

Yes.

18
19

Appears to be the same document.

It appears to be the same.

I believe I

I have seen *chis document before.
Q.

Now, calling your attention to a document

20

attached as the last three pages of Exhibit 3, I ask you

21

to take a look at this document which purports to be a

22

copy of a letter written by Mr. Noble.

23

you ever seen that letter before?

24
25

A.

I'll ask have

If I've seen it before, it was cursory.

I

I didn't go through it in detail, and I probably have seen
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it.
Q.

Do you recall whether at the time that letter

was written you were involved with Mr. Noble in the
purported problems of this building?
A.

I don't believe I was.

Q.

I would like you to look at the items listed

on that letter and tell me, in your opinion, which of
those items, if any, would cause imminent danger to life
or limb.
A.

There are a couple of these that may present a

danger but not necessarily imminent danger.

The stair-

ways not arranged or finished on the west side of the
building on the second floor.

Lateral bracing, those

are problems that could present a structural or physical
danger but probably not imminent.

At least if it was

imminent, I think it would have been emphasized more,
take it down, on the stairs, for instance, take it down.
Q.

Those two that you've mentioned, are they the

types of items that you would normally expect could be
repaired during continued occupancy?
A.

Probably, yes, in most cases.

Q.

Are there any other items in there that you

believe are life threatening or potentially so?
A.

Not imminent life threatening.

Q.

I believe you said that you normally would not

MPD A. GREENIG - CAPITOL REPORTERS
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1

| require a building to be vacated unless it was

2

| imminently life threatening?

3

|

4

| That is that if over a period of time there's no

5

| apparent effort to correct the situation, you know, if

6

I the person isn't diligently trying to correct the

7

| deficiencies, at some point in time we'd have to say if

8

| you're not going to fix it you'll have to get out.

9

I we'll generally let that go for quite a while.

10

A.

Q.

That's correct.

May I add one thing to that.

But

Then normally you'd tell them that, say, look,

11

this is getting too far down the road, and if it isn't

12

fixed by a certain date we're going to have to have you

13

get out?

14

A.

15
16

Yes, that's correct.
MR. WELLS:

We've got five to 12:00.

want to break and do lunch and then bring those back?

17

MS. MARLOWE:

18

MR. WELLS:

19

(Noon recess.)

20
21

That's fine.
Let's shoot for 1:30.

*
April 23, 1990

22
23

Do you

*

*
2:00 p.m.

(Exhibits 5 and 6 marked.)
Q.

I'll hand you what has been marked as Exhibit

24

5 which you previously identified and which does not

25

have superimposed thereon the return receipt for the
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1

Q.

In reaching a net figure for the cost of the move

2

and of renting the alternate space, did you deduct that amount

3

from the total?

4

A.

Yes, I did.

5

Q.

What is the net amount of the loss resulting from

6

the two moves and the renting of the alternate space?

7

A.

The net amount is $351,604.20.

8

Q.

Have you prepared an Exhibit 245 that shows that

9
10

breakdown?
A.

Yes, I have.

11

MR. WELLS:

12

Do you have an objection to 243?

13

MR. DEL BARTEL:

14

MR. WELLS:

May we have 243 admitted, your Honor?

15

THE COURT:

The exhibit is received.

16

MR. WELLS:

That's all we have, subject to the

17

admission of the two exhibits.

IS

THE COURT:

21
22
23

No.

Cross-examination?
CROSS-EXAMINATION

19
20

We would move the admission of 245.

BY MR. DEL BARTEL:
Q.

Exhibit 243 shows there are payments made to Frank

Klenk, Brad Klenk, and Earl Nay.
A.

They by trade are not.

Were those people movers?
But we had some book shelves

24

that they had made, and those were needed to be taken apart,

25

and they moved them over to the building.
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Q.

What was that amount?

A.

$37,268.

Q.

Would you put that in.

A.

(The witness complies.)

Q.

And you have a miscellaneous category.

What amount

did you put into your bid for miscellaneous items?
A.

$11,816.

Q.

Would you put that in, please.

A.

(The witness complies.)

Q.

And that gives us a total cost of

A.

$333,515.

Q.

Did you represent to Mr. Debry that you would

—

contract with him to bring the building to code and get a
certificate of occupancy for that amount?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Mr. Karren, would you describe to the jury what

repairs your bid would include with respect to the masonry
portion of the bid, and why you included each item in that
bid.
A.

The masonry, the following items would be fixed:

The placement of steel reinforcement, grouting, ledger bolts,
ledgers, diaphragm strap anchors.

That would be —

the

masonry would be brought up to code so it could take
earthquake forces.
Q.

Is that a difficult process?
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